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 The FCC’s “ancillary jurisdiction” refers to the agency’s residual 
authority to regulate matters over which it lacks explicit statutory au-
thority under the Communications Act of 1934. Because many of to-
day’s most controversial and consequential policy debates involve new 
technologies not explicitly covered by that statute, the scope of the 
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction has taken on a critical new importance in 
recent years. In particular, the future of Federal Internet policy de-
pends on resolving the questions surrounding ancillary jurisdiction. 
In this Article, I provide a new theory of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdic-
tion, arguing that it is best understood as an authority to promote 
market competition. More specifically, ancillary jurisdiction has pri-
marily addressed and promoted competition in markets where vertic-
al leveraging is a concern—particularly those involving legacy net-
work infrastructure. My argument has both a positive and normative 
dimension. Descriptively, I argue that the competition-promotion 
framework provides the most persuasive and coherent account of the 
seemingly incoherent line of cases reviewing the FCC’s ancillary ju-
risdiction. Normatively, I argue that the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction 
should be exercised in this manner, in large part to protect the doc-
trine’s viability in the face of increasing criticism and to shape it in a 
way that both promotes competition and limits agency capture. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 In 1965, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had a 
problem. Cable television, a relatively new service, was wreaking ha-
voc on the FCC’s established regulatory order. The FCC, it seemed, 
was powerless to stop it. 
 The problem traced back several decades to the Communications 
Act of 1934 (Communications Act), which created the FCC but gave it 
limited regulatory authority.1 Everyone agreed that the Communica-
tions Act authorized the FCC to regulate contemporary communica-
tions providers, such as telephone companies and radio broadcasting 
stations. But cable service was a different animal—it was a regulato-
ry platypus that defied the FCC’s traditional regulatory classifica-
tions. Because this strange new technology did not exist in 1934 
when the Communications Act was enacted, the FCC lacked explicit 
authority to regulate it. Further, Congress declined to enact new  
legislation granting this authority to the FCC.2 In short, the FCC had 
a problem. 
 It soon, however, found a solution—a novel and controversial solu-
tion whose repercussions continue to be felt more than forty years 
later. With the courts’ eventual blessing, the FCC announced a new 
                                                                                                                    
 1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-16, 48 Stat. 1064; see also 47 U.S.C. § 
151 (2006). 
 2. See Amendment of Parts 21, 74 (Proposed Subpart J), and 91 to Adopt Rules  
and Regulations Relating to the Distribution of Television Broadcast Signals by Communi-
ty Antenna Television Systems, and Related Matters, 30 Fed. Reg. 6078 (proposed Apr.  
29, 1965) (codified at 47 CFR pts. 21, 74) (notice of inquiry and notice of proposed rulemak-
ing) (providing an overview of proposed legislation over various congressional sessions to 
regulate cable service and reaching tentative conclusion that FCC had jurisdiction over  
cable service).  
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type of authority which came to be known as the FCC’s “ancillary ju-
risdiction.”3 Under this authority, the FCC could regulate services 
that were merely related (or “ancillary”) to regulatory objectives ex-
plicitly referenced in the Communications Act.4 As applied to cable, 
the Supreme Court eventually affirmed that the FCC could exercise 
ancillary jurisdiction over cable service because the new regulations 
were “reasonably ancillary” to the FCC’s existing television broad-
casting regulations.5 Problem solved . . . sort of. 
 As it turned out, the FCC’s solution soon created new problems of 
its own. These problems remain with us today and lie at the heart of 
some of our most contentious and consequential policy debates. In 
particular, the future of Federal Internet policy depends on resolving 
the questions surrounding ancillary jurisdiction. 
 Analyzing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction has been an exercise in 
confusion. Courts and scholars have criticized this authority as being 
vague and incoherent.6 Others have criticized it as a virtually limit-
less authority.7 Despite these criticisms, it is clear that ancillary ju-
risdiction is a critically important foundation of modern communica-
tions policy. Indeed, several of the FCC’s most important decisions 
have been based on this authority.8
 Looking ahead, determining the proper scope of the FCC’s ancil-
lary jurisdiction will grow even more important as the agency decides 
whether and how to regulate emerging Internet-related services over 
which it lacks explicit jurisdiction.9 In fact, these debates are already 
raging at the FCC and in the courts. In October 2009, for instance, 
the FCC proposed historic new regulations—based entirely on its an-
cillary jurisdiction—that would prohibit various forms of discrimina-
tion by broadband access providers.10 At the same time, the D.C. Cir-
cuit is currently hearing a challenge to the FCC’s 2008 order finding 
                                                                                                                    
 3. See Amendment of Parts 21, 74, and 91 to Adopt Rules and Regulations Relating 
to the Distribution of Television Broadcast Signals by Community Antenna Television Sys-
tems, and Related Matters, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, ¶ 19 (1966) (second report and order) (conclud-
ing that FCC had jurisdiction over cable service). 
 4. See id. 
 5. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 55-75 for examples of these proceedings. 
 9. With respect to many of these services, the jurisdiction is not clear because those 
services have been formally deregulated under Title I of the Communications Act. 
JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 220-21 (2005) (“The precise dimen-
sions of the FCC’s ancillary authority will assume increasing importance as the Commis-
sion folds within the deregulatory scope of Title I the growing number of applications-layer 
IP products that resemble [traditionally regulated] services . . . .”). 
 10. Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-
191, FCC 09-93, ¶¶ 16, 83 (Oct. 22, 2009) (notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter 2009 
Notice], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-09-93A1.pdf. 
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that Comcast (a cable broadband access provider) violated federal 
policy by blocking peer-to-peer applications.11 This order, which also 
relied entirely on the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction, is currently being 
challenged in court on jurisdictional grounds.12 If the order is re-
versed, it will likely jeopardize the FCC’s authority to enact any form 
of broadband regulations, including its most recent proposed rules.
 Given the importance of ancillary jurisdiction to modern policy, 
the literature has been surprisingly silent about it, offering mostly 
superficial summaries or limited analyses buried within larger piec-
es.13 These relatively limited analyses do not provide convincing de-
scriptive accounts of when courts have upheld the FCC’s exercises of 
its ancillary jurisdiction. For instance, some argue that there is no 
logic at all to the courts’ decisions, while others contend that the cas-
es turn on the existence of specific factors such as the presence of 
new technology or the regulations’ relationship with preexisting leg-
islation.14 While superficially appealing, none of these descriptions 
withstand scrutiny. 
 In this Article, I provide a new unified theory of the FCC’s ancil-
lary jurisdiction. Specifically, I argue that ancillary jurisdiction is 
best understood as an authority to promote market competition. Ad-
mittedly, “competition” is a broad term that encompasses several di-
verse concepts.15 Accordingly, my analysis focuses primarily upon 
promoting competition (and limiting anticompetitive conduct) within 
markets where vertical leveraging concerns exist—particularly those 
markets involving dominant infrastructure providers such as legacy 
incumbent telephone companies.16
 My argument has both a positive and normative dimension. De-
scriptively, I argue that the competition-promotion framework pro-
vides the most persuasive and coherent account of the seemingly in-
coherent line of cases reviewing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction. As I 
show, the best predictor of whether courts will uphold the FCC’s ex-
                                                                                                                    
 11. In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (Aug. 20, 
2008) (memorandum opinion and order) [hereinafter Comcast Order], available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf.  
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 79-82. Specifically, Comcast has challenged the 
order on both jurisdictional and procedural grounds, and the case is currently pending be-
fore the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See Cable, CABLE COMM. DAILY, Sept. 10, 2008. 
 13. See infra note 109. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See, e.g., John Blevins, A Fragile Foundation—The Role of “Intermodal” and “Fa-
cilities-Based” Competition in Communications Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 241 (2009) (outlin-
ing various theories of competition underlying modern communications policy).  
 16. Vertical leveraging generally refers to using market power in an input market to 
affect a downstream market. See Pietro Crocioni, Leveraging of Market Power in Emerging 
Markets: A Review of Cases, Literature, and a Suggested Framework, 4 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 449, 452-55 (2008). 
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ercises of ancillary jurisdiction is whether the regulation attempts to 
facilitate market competition, largely in the sense of limiting poten-
tial vertical leveraging by dominant providers. 
 Normatively, I argue that the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction should
be exercised in this manner—that is, courts or Congress should limit 
the FCC’s authority in this context to facilitating market competition 
in this manner. Likewise, courts should reject the use of ancillary ju-
risdiction for other objectives, particularly social goals that are theo-
retically appealing, but are often nothing more than incumbent pro-
tections in disguise.  
 Limiting the scope of ancillary jurisdiction in this manner offers a 
number of benefits that will help protect the doctrine’s viability in 
the face of increasing criticisms. First, it adds both coherence and 
concrete limits to a notoriously vague and potentially unlimited doc-
trine. Second, it allows courts and other policymakers to shape ancil-
lary jurisdiction as a market-promoting tool that will help prevent 
agency capture by providing a powerful ex ante constraint on the 
FCC’s ability to benefit entrenched incumbents through its ancillary 
jurisdiction authority. In essence, my proposal would maximize the 
FCC’s power in regulatory contexts where it is least likely to be act-
ing for the benefit of entrenched providers. Finally, the framework 
that I propose confers legitimacy on the ancillary jurisdiction doc-
trine by aligning it closely with decades of precedent. 
 Part II provides an overview of ancillary jurisdiction, listing both 
examples of—and problems with—the doctrine. Part III illustrates 
why existing descriptive accounts of the cases that uphold or reject 
the FCC’s ancillary regulations are unpersuasive. Part IV provides a 
new descriptive account, arguing that ancillary jurisdiction is best 
understood as a competition-promotion authority, in the sense de-
scribed above. Part V provides a normative proposal and describes 
the policy benefits of conceptualizing ancillary jurisdiction through a 
competition-promotion framework. 
II.   ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: AN OVERVIEW
 This Part provides an introduction to the ancillary jurisdiction 
doctrine, arguing that it arose in response to specific structural gaps 
in the Communications Act. It next provides examples of how the 
FCC has used (and proposes to use) ancillary jurisdiction, thereby il-
lustrating the doctrine’s importance to modern communications poli-
cy. Finally, it outlines the problems and criticisms that surround the 
doctrine; specifically, that it is a vague and limitless authority. 
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A.   The Problem: Structural Gaps in the  
Communications Act of 1934 
 The story of ancillary jurisdiction begins with the birth of cable 
television. In 1934, when President Roosevelt signed the Communi-
cations Act into law, no one had ever heard of cable television.17
Years later, however, someone got the idea of capturing over-the-air 
television broadcast signals on antennae and transmitting them to 
rural communities over cable wires.18 From these humble beginnings, 
cable television was born. And it grew quickly, eventually drawing 
the attention of television broadcast interests who saw it as a com-
petitive threat.19   
 The growth of cable service almost immediately created regulato-
ry headaches for the FCC.20 These headaches stemmed from the orig-
inal structure of the Communications Act and, more specifically, 
from the Act’s “silo-based” structure, which remains with us even to-
day. A brief overview of the structure and history of the Act is critical 
to understanding why ancillary jurisdiction ultimately emerged in 
the late 1960s. 
 The structure of the Communications Act is a product of a tech-
nologically bygone era. It consists of a series of titles that divide the 
world into providers rather than functions.21 The individual titles 
                                                                                                                    
 17. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-16, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in  
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Cable television was first used in the late 1940s.  
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 627 (1994) (“The earliest cable systems  
were built in the late 1940’s to bring clear broadcast television signals to remote or moun-
tainous communities.”). 
 18. See Robert W. Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Does Video Delivered 
over a Telephone Network Require a Cable Franchise?, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 259 (2007) 
(“Cable television began in the late 1940s as shared noncommercial community antenna 
television (“CATV”) services to improve signal reception in areas where it was poor.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 278, 312 (2004) (“[B]y the late 1950s, . . . broadcasters realized cable’s threat as a  
successor industry.”). 
 20. For instance, in 1949, an FCC secretary wrote to Ed Parsons in Astoria, Oregon, 
“asking him to explain his community-antenna television system.” Randy Alfred, Aug. 1, 
1949: FCC Gets in on Cable TV, WIRED, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.wired.com/science/ 
discoveries/news/2008/08/dayintech_0801.  
 21. Scholars are almost uniformly critical of the silo structure. Rather than lumping 
providers into a specified title or “bucket,” an alternative regulatory structure (one that 
most scholars recommend) would be to regulate “horizontally” by network layer. See, e.g.,
Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communi-
cations, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 19-22 (2006). Regulations, they argue, 
should focus on the network layer where a given activity takes place, not upon the label 
given to the provider or the infrastructure. Id. For instance, a Title III wireless company 
providing broadband access at the transport layer should not be subject to an entirely dif-
ferent set of regulations than a Title II wireline telephone company offering the same ser-
vice at the same network layer. Although a comprehensive review of the “layers” proposals 
is beyond the scope of this Article, see generally Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and 
Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New 
Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207 (2003); John T. Nakahata, Regulating Informa-
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correspond to—and regulate—a specific type of provider or network. 
For instance, Title II covers only common carriers (telephones, tele-
graphs), while Title III covers only “radio” providers (radio, TV, wire-
less—all of which use radio spectrum). Congress eventually added 
Title VI in 1984 to cover cable providers.22
 Under this framework, the appropriate regulation depends not on 
the function of the service, but on the label the FCC chooses to apply 
to the provider or to the network infrastructure over which service is 
provided. In fact, the FCC often regulates identical services different-
ly if the providers or infrastructure have different “labels” (e.g., wire-
line telephone voice service falls within Title II, while wireless voice 
service over radio spectrum falls within Title III).23 As the below dia-
gram illustrates, this traditional approach creates vertical regulatory 
“silos.”24
                                                                                                                    
tion Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Communications Regulation from the Bottom 
Up, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95 (2002); Douglas C. Sicker & Lisa Blumensaadt, 
Misunderstanding the Layered Model(s), 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 299 (2006); 
Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L. Mindel, Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommuni-
cations Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2002); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn 
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
815 (2004); Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 1 (2002); Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law 
for the Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 59 (2005); Kevin Werbach, A
Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 39-40 (2002); 
and Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications 
Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 
(2004). But see David P. Reed, Critiquing the Layered Regulatory Model, 4 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 281 (2006).
 22. For an overview of these titles, see J. Scott Marcus, The Potential Relevance to the 
United States of the European Union’s Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework for Telecom-
munications 3-4 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 36, 2002), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-224213A2.pdf.  
 23. Whitt, supra note 21, at 596-97. 
 24. Richard Whitt also refers to these as “buckets.” Id. at 590-91 (“The Communica-
tions Act and implementing rules divide up the landscape based on traditional service, 
technology, and industry labels . . . . These divisions assume clear, unwavering distinc-
tions, with different categories defined by the assumed static characteristics of discrete 
services or networks. The result is an inflexible approach of isolated ‘buckets’ or ‘silos’ go-
verned by black-and-white, all-or-nothing thinking.”).  
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FIGURE 1 
 The Communications Act, however, also includes other titles that 
are not specifically linked to a type of communications service pro-
vider or network infrastructure. These are generally administrative 
and penal provisions.25 The most important one for purposes here, 
Title I,26 belongs in a class of its own. It is the introductory title that 
lists the FCC’s purposes,27 outlines the agency’s general jurisdic-
tion,28 establishes internal procedures,29 and includes a “necessary 
and proper” clause.30 Critically, it is Title I that ultimately (and contro-
versially) becomes the foundation of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction. 
 Congress structured the Communications Act in this manner for 
specific historical reasons. Prior to the Act, both common carriers 
and radio broadcasters were federally regulated, albeit by different 
agencies. The Federal Radio Commission (FRC) regulated radio 
broadcasting under the Radio Act of 1927,31 and the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) regulated common carriers (railroads, tele-
phones, telegraphs) under the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA).32 Con-
                                                                                                                    
 25. Title IV, for instance, includes various administrative and procedural provisions. 
47 U.S.C. §§ 401-416 (2006). Title V includes penal provisions. 47 U.S.C. §§ 501-510; see al-
so Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The 
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 517-18 (2002) (providing overview of statuto-
ry titles).  
 26. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161. 
 27. Id. § 151.  
 28. Id. § 152.  
 29. Id. § 154.  
 30. Id. § 154(i).  
 31. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934) (creating 
FRC). The 1927 Act expanded upon the Radio Act of 1912, which had originally established 
federal jurisdiction over radio transmissions. See Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 
Stat. 302 (1912). 
 32. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) (amending ICA to en-
compass telephone and telegraph services). 
2009]          JURISDICTION AS COMPETITION PROMOTION 593 
gress, however, eventually grew concerned that the ICC was too 
preoccupied with railroads to give communications services proper 
attention.33 When drafting the new legislation, Congress therefore 
carved out these services from the ICC’s jurisdiction, which allowed 
the agency to focus on railroads.34
 The Communications Act of 1934 combined these two categories of 
communications services (common carriers and broadcasters) under 
one roof and created the FCC to govern them.35 The Act’s ultimate 
structure reflected this merger. Title II became the common carrier 
section, while Title III became the broadcasting section. In drafting 
the new law, Congress essentially copied the older laws, usually ver-
batim, and inserted them into the new Act.36 For instance, Title II 
came directly from the ICA, while Title III is more or less the Radio 
Act of 1927.37
 The problem with this structure is that it reflected the technologi-
cal conditions of 1934. The FCC’s authority over common carrier  
and radio providers was clear enough, but what happened if a new 
type of communications provider appeared? Would the Communica-
tions Act apply? 
 When cable service appeared on the scene years later, these ques-
tions became more than academic. Indeed, the FCC struggled with 
them for years.38 Because cable service was neither a common carrier 
nor a broadcaster, it did not fit cleanly into any of the existing 
                                                                                                                    
 33. Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and 
Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 
3, 5 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). 
 34. Id. at 4. 
 35. PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS 359-60 (2004) (discussing origins of “proposal to create a unified com-
munications commission that would assume the FRC’s functions as well as the responsibil-
ities of the Interstate Commerce Commission for regulating the telephone industry”). 
 36. Robinson, supra note 33, at 3; STARR, supra note 35, at 360 (“Although it formally 
repealed the Radio Act of 1927, the new measure reenacted nearly all the provisions of the 
earlier legislation, much of it verbatim.”). 
 37. See Robinson, supra note 33, at 3; see also Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes, 
The Common Carrier Provisions—A Product of Evolutionary Development, in A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 25, 30 (Max D. Paglin ed., 
1989); STARR, supra note 35, at 360; J. Roger Wollenberg, The FCC as Arbiter of “The Pub-
lic Interest, Convenience, and Necessity,” in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 61, 70-71 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); James B. Speta, A
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 263 (2002) 
(“The common carrier provisions of the Act largely copied the ICA.”). 
 38. For one of the best overviews of the FCC’s initial regulatory struggles with cable, 
see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority over 
Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 NW. U. L. REV.
403, 433-37 (1982).  
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titles.39 Thus, the FCC arguably had no jurisdiction over cable service 
at all.40
 The regulatory quandary that cable posed, however, was merely 
symbolic of a larger problem, one made more pressing by the even-
tual growth of data processing and computer services in the 1960s 
and 1970s (services that were similarly unknown in 1934). The prob-
lem was that technology changed quickly, while the FCC’s statutory 
delegation did not. Plus, Congress has been notoriously reluctant and 
slow to amend the Act throughout its history.41 Thus, to effectively 
regulate American communications services, the FCC needed flexibil-
ity. Yet, at the same time, it needed to act within the bounds of its 
statutory delegation of authority. 
 The Act’s unique statutory structure, however, made it difficult 
for the FCC to strike this balance between flexibility and legality. 
The FCC’s most obvious obstacle was that the silo-based titles did 
not explicitly contemplate new services like cable and data 
processing. Indeed, opponents of expanded FCC jurisdiction could 
make a strong expressio unius argument against agency jurisdic-
tion.42 Congress, the opponents could argue, not only specifically 
listed the types of providers the FCC could regulate, but it imposed 
exceedingly specific requirements upon them. This level of detail ar-
guably excluded by implication any nonlisted services. 
 In sum, the FCC had to thread a delicate needle. It needed flex-
ibility to address the challenges of new technology, but it also needed 
                                                                                                                    
 39. For instance, cable service used wires like carriers did, but the transmissions 
were only one way. At the same time, cable providers transmitted video programming like 
broadcasters did, but generally not over radio spectrum. That said, some early cable com-
panies, however, used microwave facilities for transmissions or parts of the transmission, 
and, because they used spectrum, the FCC had extended regulations to them before ex-
tending to all cable service. See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to Adopt Rules and 
Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Business Radio Service for Mi-
crowave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 38 F.C.C. 
683, 683-84 (1965) (first report and order). 
 40. For instance, in 1958, the FCC concluded internally in Frontier Broadcasting Co. 
v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958), that cable was beyond the reach of both Title II and Title 
III jurisdiction. Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 434-35. Interestingly, just a 
few years earlier in 1952, the FCC had internally concluded that it could regulate cable as 
a common carrier under Title II. Id. at 433-34. Quite clearly, the rise of cable caused regu-
latory confusion. 
 41. The first, and only, comprehensive amendment was the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Oth-
er significant amendments in 1984 and 1992 primarily related to cable services. See Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 
Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)); Cable Communications Poli-
cy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered sections of  
47 U.S.C.). 
 42. The full interpretative canon is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means 
the “expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Fed-
eral Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086-87 (2002). 
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to remain within the confines of its authority. The FCC eventually 
found a solution: ancillary jurisdiction. 
B.   The Solution: The Rise of Ancillary Jurisdiction 
1.   Overview of the Doctrine 
 Ancillary jurisdiction refers to the FCC’s power to regulate mat-
ters (e.g., services, providers) not explicitly listed in the Communica-
tions Act. For practical purposes, it is a “catch-all” residual jurisdic-
tion that is used when the FCC lacks more explicit statutory authori-
ty.43 This Section briefly introduces the ancillary jurisdiction doc-
trine, with an eye toward how it navigates the FCC’s challenge of 
maintaining flexibility while simultaneously remaining within its 
statutory authority.  
 In 1968, the Supreme Court first endorsed the concept of ancillary 
jurisdiction in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.44 In this se-
minal case, the Court concluded that the FCC has the authority to 
issue regulations “reasonably ancillary to the effective performance 
of the Commission’s various responsibilities.”45 (Thus the name  
“ancillary jurisdiction.”) In plain language, the FCC’s regulations 
must be related to something else—i.e., some other provision or regu-
latory scheme. 
 Southwestern Cable Co. remains good law, and its holding has 
since solidified into a more formal two-pronged test.46 First, ancillary 
jurisdiction exists if the regulation falls within the FCC’s general ju-
risdiction under 47 U.S.C. § 152.47 That is, the regulation must ad-
dress an “interstate [or] foreign communication by wire or radio.”48
                                                                                                                    
 43. Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 41, 50-51 (2003) (“To regulate outside of its direct mandate, the FCC must rely on its 
‘Title I’ or ‘ancillary jurisdiction’ authority. The justification for this form of FCC action 
stems from a catch-all provision—contained in Title I of the Communications Act [at § 
154(i)] . . . .”). 
 44. 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). Admittedly, the Supreme Court had held much earlier 
that the FCC had “expansive powers” under the Communications Act. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. 
United States (NBC), 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943). As explained infra in Part III.A, although 
NBC provided important groundwork for Southwestern Cable Co., it did not establish an-
cillary jurisdiction in the modern sense of the doctrine. Crucially, the regulations at issue 
in NBC were applicable to broadcasting stations, which clearly fell within Title III of the 
Communications Act. Although the regulations were a backdoor attempt to regulate net-
works (which were also technically outside the scope of the Communications Act), the regu-
lations were tailored—for jurisdictional purposes—to apply to only the stations actually 
broadcasting signals. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 429-32. 
 45. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added). 
 46. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 47. Id. at 700.  
 48. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006).
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Second, the regulation must be “reasonably ancillary” to the perfor-
mance of other FCC objectives and responsibilities.49
 Together, the two prongs help the FCC strike a balance between 
regulatory flexibility and legality. With respect to the former, the 
two-pronged standard ensures flexibility by incorporating broad lan-
guage. For instance, the first prong defines the FCC’s general juris-
diction expansively to cover any communication by “wire or radio.”
Similarly, the second prong gives the FCC wide latitude by incorpo-
rating a broad “reasonableness” standard. This flexibility is particu-
larly important to the FCC in light of the uniquely rapid evolution of 
communications technologies.50
 At the same time, however, both prongs of the doctrine require the 
FCC to remain within the statutory confines of the Communications 
Act. To validly exercise ancillary jurisdiction, the regulated subject 
must first fall within § 152’s general jurisdiction.51 Next, the FCC 
must not only identify an explicit statutory foundation (a “hook”), it 
must also show that its new regulation is sufficiently related to the 
statutory hook.52
 For this reason, it is inaccurate to characterize ancillary jurisdic-
tion as an authority to reach beyond the Communications Act. Doc-
trinally speaking, ancillary regulations are part and parcel of the 
FCC’s delegated statutory authority—just as congressional actions 
deemed “necessary and proper” to enumerated constitutional powers 
are also deemed valid.53
2.   Examples: Ancillary Jurisdiction, Past and Present 
 Ancillary jurisdiction has played—and continues to play—a criti-
cal role in modern communications policy. Many of the FCC’s most 
important—and most controversial—regulatory schemes have been 
based upon its ancillary authority. Below, I provide a partial list of 
important FCC regulatory actions that were both based upon the 
agency’s ancillary jurisdiction and reviewed by courts. (A more com-
                                                                                                                    
 49. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 700. 
 50. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 846, 853 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The Communications 
Act was designed to endow the Commission with sufficiently elastic powers such that it 
could readily accommodate dynamic new developments in the field of communications.”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Courts have repeatedly referred to § 154(i)—the textual foundation of ancillary ju-
risdiction—“as the ‘necessary and proper clause.’ ” See, e.g., Mobile Commc’ns Corp. of Am. 
v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1996); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 
1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); N. Am. Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th 
Cir. 1985). 
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prehensive list that includes lesser-known cases is provided in the 
footnotes.54) These proceedings include the following:  
? Computer Inquiry II. In the Computer Inquiry decisions 
(Computer I, II, and III),55 the FCC grappled with the regu-
latory  status of new “advanced” data-processing services—
which ultimately included computer services.56 The most 
famous of these decisions—Computer II in 1976—has been 
hailed as one of the FCC’s greatest regulatory successes, 
creating the conditions for the Internet’s phenomenal 
growth.57 In this proceeding, the FCC erected a regulatory 
wall between “basic” transport services and newer “en-
hanced” computer services.58 Critically, although the FCC 
allowed incumbent carriers to enter the enhanced services 
market, it imposed various regulatory requirements to pre-
vent those carriers from leveraging their subsidized legacy 
infrastructure to gain an unfair competitive advantage. 
These requirements included various structural separations 
                                                                                                                    
 54. See cases cited infra notes 76-77. Note, however, that the examples I provide in 
this section consist of cases reviewing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction. It is not a compre-
hensive list of every FCC order or adjudication that cites ancillary jurisdiction as authori-
ty. The focus on cases rather than regulatory orders will be addressed at length in a later 
section. See infra Part IV. 
 55. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer 
and Communications Services and Facilities (Computer I), 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (tenta-
tive decision of the commission); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules 
and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry) (Computer II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final 
decision); Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations 
(Third Computer Inquiry) (Computer III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order). Col-
lectively known as the Computer Inquiries, these are only the final orders—the proceed-
ings themselves included notices of inquiries and of proposed rulemakings, which generat-
ed thousands of comments.  
 56. For a good overview of the decisions, see generally Robert Cannon, The Legacy  
of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J.
167 (2003). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 169 (arguing that Computer Inquiries “were a necessary precondi-
tion for the success of the Internet”); Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertic-
al Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regula-
tion in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 130 (2003) (“Of the actions taken  
in the Computer Inquiries, Computer II’s open access rules . . . were the most successful 
and enduring.”); Whitt, supra note 21, at 599 (explaining that Computer Inquiries
“contributed strongly towards the commercial introduction, rise, and incredible success  
of the Internet” (quoting Letter from Vinton G. Cerf, Senior Vice-President, WorldCom, 
Inc., to the Honorable Donald Evans, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, and the Honorable 
Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC (May 20, 2002))); Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunica-
tions Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 15, 17 n.5 (2006) (calling Computer Inquiries one of “U.S. telecommunications 
law’s greatest successes”).  
 58. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d ¶¶ 2-9. The “basic/enhanced” division remains with us 
today, although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 renamed them as “information” and 
“telecommunications” services, respectively. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (46) (2006).  
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and unbundling mandates.59 The courts ultimately upheld 
these requirements as exercises of ancillary jurisdiction.60
? Cable Regulation. Ancillary jurisdiction provided the sole 
basis for cable regulation prior to 1984, when Congress fi-
nally added Title VI to the Communications Act, thus pro-
viding the FCC with explicit authority to regulate cable.61
The pre-Title VI regulations, however, were comprehensive 
and often quite intrusive. They included access require-
ments, must-carry provisions, and even mandates that cable 
companies originate their own programming content.62 As 
explained more fully in Part IV, courts upheld some of these 
regulations, but rejected others.
? Television Network Regulation. Following Southwestern 
Cable, the FCC extended its regulatory regime to television 
networks.63 While Title III clearly covered broadcast station 
affiliates, the FCC had to rely on ancillary jurisdiction to 
reach the networks themselves because they technically did 
not broadcast anything.64 These regulations were often quite 
intrusive, sharp limits on the ability of network corporations 
to enter the syndication market and to obtain financial in-
terests in video programming production.65
? Carterfone. In a famous series of proceedings that included 
the 1968 Carterfone Order, the FCC established the right of 
consumers to attach any nonharmful device to the telephone 
network.66 Prior to these decisions, incumbent telephone 
carriers had strictly limited the types of communication de-
vices consumers could attach. The Carterfone regime has al-
so been hailed as a success—credited for unleashing innova-
tive devices such as modems, faxes, and answering ma-
                                                                                                                    
 59. See Cannon, supra note 56, at 192-94. 
 60. Computer II was upheld by Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n v. FCC,
693 F.2d 198, 202-03, 212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The most significant Computer I regulations 
were upheld by GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 732 (2d Cir. 1973). Part IV.B. will 
address the aspects of Computer I that the court reversed. 
 61. Kyle D. Dixon & Philip J. Weiser, A Digital Age Communications Act Paradigm 
for Federal-State Relations, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 321, 349-50 (2006). 
 62. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 696-700 
(1979) (providing an overview of cable regulations predating Title VI). 
 63. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 489 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming 
television network regulations). 
 64. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 428-29.  
 65. See Tamber Christian, The Financial Interest and Syndication Rules—Take Two,
3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 107, 107-09 (1995). 
 66. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service (Carterfone), 13 
F.C.C.2d 420, 423-24 (1968) (decision). 
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chines.67 When states tried to reregulate terminal  
equipment following Carterfone, the FCC preempted state 
regulation under its ancillary jurisdiction, and courts upheld 
the action.68
? Universal Service Fund. The Universal Service Fund 
(USF) is essentially a tax that subsidizes telephone and 
wireless service in rural areas, where such service might 
otherwise be prohibitively expensive. (It shows up as a line 
item on your monthly telephone bill.) Although Congress 
formally authorized the USF under the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996,69 the FCC first proposed the USF in 1983,  
and courts upheld it as a valid exercise of the agency’s ancil-
lary jurisdiction.70
? Broadcast Flag. The so-called “broadcast flag” is a digital 
code that prevents the unauthorized redistribution of digital 
broadcasts.71 Fearing that the looming transition from ana-
log to digital television would enable copyright infringe-
ment, the FCC in 2003 controversially required manufac-
turers of “devices capable of receiving digital television 
broadcast signals”72 to recognize the flag, which would pre-
vent retransmission.73 The FCC based these regulations 
upon its ancillary jurisdiction authority,74 but the D.C. Cir-
cuit rejected the argument and vacated the regulations.75
 Moving beyond this partial list to the ancillary jurisdiction cases 
as a whole, courts have upheld the FCC’s ancillary authority in the 
overwhelming majority of cases.76 Courts have, however, rejected the 
                                                                                                                    
 67. C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regu-
lation, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 135, 176 (2008) (conceding that Carterfone helped unleash “ap-
plications such as modems and fax machines”); Weiser, supra note 43, at 68 (calling Carter-
fone “universally praised”); Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 389, 397 (2007) 
(crediting Carterphone for “mass consumer versions of the fax machine, the answering ma-
chine, and, perhaps most importantly, the modem”). 
 68. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1050-52 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding 
preemption of state regulation of terminal equipment despite “absence of explicit statutory 
authorization”); see also Weiser, supra note 43, at 66 (“These rules, which govern the 
equipment that can be used in connection with the telecommunications network, were ul-
timately upheld as a legitimate use of the FCC’s Title I authority.”). 
 69. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); see also 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006). 
 70. See, e.g., Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1310-12, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
 71. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC., 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23550 (2003) (report and 
order and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (adopting broadcast flag requirements).  
74. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 691. 
75. Id. at 692, 705. 
 76. In addition to the cases already cited above, courts also upheld the FCC’s ancillary 
regulations in the following cases. United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I),
406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972) (upholding various ancillary regulations of cable service); City of 
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FCC’s assertions of ancillary jurisdiction in a handful of significant 
cases, many of them involving pre-1984 cable regulations.77 Interes-
tingly, some of these rejections have been quite recent. For instance, 
in 2002 and 2005 respectively, the D.C. Circuit rejected and sharply 
critiqued the FCC’s attempts to rely on ancillary jurisdiction to im-
pose video description (i.e., “closed captioning”) and broadcast flag 
requirements.78 The D.C. Circuit’s growing hostility to ancillary ju-
risdiction raises the question of whether the FCC’s authority will 
survive or at least be significantly pared back in the near future. 
 These new questions about the scope of the FCC’s authority come 
at a critical time. The FCC, policymakers, and scholars are currently 
debating a series of proceedings that will potentially have enormous 
influence on the future of advanced communications services (i.e., IP-
based services). In several of these proceedings, if the FCC chooses to 
act, it will have to rely on its ancillary jurisdiction to issue regulations.  
 One example of these proceedings is the recent controversy over 
Comcast’s alleged blocking of BitTorrent traffic, a case which has 
enormous policy implications in the larger network neutrality—or 
“open networks”—debate.79 Briefly, the FCC—acting upon complaints 
filed by parties such as the public interest organization Free 
                                                                                                                    
Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding ancillary regulations that 
allowed nonlocal exchange carriers to be “open video system” operators); Mobile Commc’ns 
Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404-07 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding ancillary authority 
to require wireless license payment); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC 
(NARUC II), 880 F.2d 422, 429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (confirming that FCC has ancillary au-
thority to preempt state regulation of “inside wiring” for telephone service); New England 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding ancillary au-
thority to require rate reimbursements); N. Am. Telecomms. Ass’n. v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 
1293-94 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding ancillary requirement that newly formed regional Bell 
operating companies submit capitalization plans as condition of re-entering equipment 
market); Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (uphold-
ing ancillary authority to require interim interconnection tariffs); N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. 
FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1051 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding preemption of state regulation of ter-
minal equipment despite “absence of explicit statutory authorization”); Nader v. FCC, 520 
F.2d 182, 203-05 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding authority under § 154(i) to prescribe rates of 
return); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding ancil-
lary regulations prohibiting telephone carriers from providing cable service in local areas); 
United Tel. Workers, v. FCC, 436 F.2d 920, 923-25 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (upholding ancillary 
authority to approve tariff of experimental service by Western Union and Post Office). 
 77. See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1979) (reversing access requirements 
for cable providers); Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 692, 705 (vacating broadcast flag regu-
lations); Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FCC (MPAA), 309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (vacating video description requirements); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC (HBO), 567 
F.2d 9, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (vacating programming restrictions on cablecasting); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC I), 533 F.2d 601, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (rejecting FCC’s preemption of nonvideo cable transmissions).  
 78. See Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 691-92, 705; MPAA, 309 F.3d at 798-99.  
 79. Comcast’s actions—also often referred to as “throttling”—consisted of interfering 
with peer-to-peer file uploads by sending “reset” packets that gave a false error signal. 
Brad Reed, Comcast Reshapes Traffic Management, NETWORK WORLD, June 9, 2008, at 17; 
see also Comcast Order, supra note 11, at 2-6.  
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Press80—ultimately held that Comcast violated Federal policy by 
blocking applications such as BitTorrent that used peer-to-peer pro-
tocols. The FCC also ordered Comcast to verify that it had stopped 
such actions.81 Comcast has since challenged the FCC’s authority to 
issue the order, and litigation (FCC v. Comcast) is pending in the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.82 One of the most contentious issues in 
this case is whether the FCC can validly exercise ancillary jurisdic-
tion over Comcast’s broadband service. 
 The stakes of the Comcast litigation are high because of their im-
plications on the FCC’s authority to regulate broadband access ser-
vices more generally. Indeed, the FCC has recently proposed several 
new regulations of broadband access that are intended to “preserve 
the openness of the Internet” and to help “address emerging chal-
lenges to the open Internet.”83 These proposed regulations would co-
dify the four “principles” of the FCC’s 2005 Broadband Policy State-
ment, which provided that Federal policy protect the rights of broad-
band users in various ways.84 The FCC also proposed two new prin-
ciples that would require broadband access providers to offer service  
in a “nondiscriminatory manner” and to disclose network manage-
ment practices.85
 These proposed regulations collectively encompass many of to-
day’s most important and controversial broadband policy debates, in-
cluding everything from network neutrality to “wireless Carter-
fone.”86 Further, the FCC’s only valid authority to enact these new 
rules is its ancillary jurisdiction.87 In this respect, FCC v. Comcast
will determine whether the FCC has any authority whatsoever 
over broadband access services.
                                                                                                                    
 80. Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that 
Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement, WC 
Docket No. 07-52 (Nov. 1, 2007); Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge 
Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, File No. 
EB-08-IH-1518 (Nov. 1, 2007) (cited in Comcast Order, supra note 11, at 5 n.33). 
 81. Press Release, FCC, Commission Orders Comcast to End Discriminatory Network 
Management Practices 1 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter FCC Press Release]. 
 82. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, appeal docketed, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 83. 2009 Notice, supra note 10, ¶ 5, 16 (codifying principles in Appropriate Frame-
work for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 
(2005) (policy statement) [hereinafter 2005 Policy Statement]). 
 84. The 2005 Policy Statement included four “principles” and provided that users are 
entitled to: (1) access the content of their choice; (2) access the services and applications of 
their choice; (3) connect the legal devices of their choice to the network; and (4) enjoy com-
petition among broadband access, content, and application providers. 2005 Policy State-
ment, supra note 83, at 14987-88.  
 85. 2009 Notice, supra note 10, ¶ 16. 
 86. “Wireless Carterfone” refers to Professor Tim Wu’s recent proposal that the FCC 
adopt an open attachment rule for wireless devices. See Wu, supra note 67. 
 87. 2009 Notice, supra note 10, ¶ 83-87. 
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  In short, determining the scope of ancillary jurisdiction is increa-
singly important in light of the new, ever-changing IP-based services 
that are competing with legacy services such as circuit-based tele-
phone service or traditional cable video service.88 Because these new 
services and developments are not explicitly addressed in the Com-
munications Act, FCC action in these areas will necessarily depend 
upon the scope of its ancillary jurisdiction authority. As the next sec-
tion illustrates, however, ancillary jurisdiction has several lingering 
problems that call this authority into question. 
C.   The Problems with the Solution: Criticisms  
of Ancillary Jurisdiction 
 The benefits that ancillary jurisdiction provides are also the 
source of the criticisms surrounding it. Recall that the doctrine arose 
in response to a specific challenge—the need to expand the FCC’s 
flexibility while remaining within its statutory authority. Virtually 
no one feels that the doctrine has proven too constraining. The criti-
cisms have instead focused primarily on the doctrine’s flexibility or—
more precisely—on its alleged excessive flexibility.  
 For instance, Professor Susan Crawford has argued that ancillary 
jurisdiction has become a potentially unlimited authority. She writes 
that the current doctrine “give[s] the FCC almost unlimited power 
over anything concerning a wire or a radio signal.”89 Professor James 
B. Speta has similarly referred to the doctrine as “untethered.”90
Even Justice Scalia has criticized this “undefined” authority and ex-
pressed doubt that the doctrine “constrains the agency in any mea-
ningful way.”91
 A second common critique is that the doctrine is simply vague and 
“amorphous.”92 Professor Phillip Weiser has written that the doctrine 
“is hardly a model of clarity or consistency.”93 On the question of the 
types of circumstances in which the FCC may invoke its Title I ancil-
lary jurisdiction, Professors Jonathan Nuechterlein and Philip Weis-
er posit that “[t]he answer to this question is as unclear as it is con-
                                                                                                                    
 88. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 220. 
 89. Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car, & the Internet, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 873, 925-26 (2006) (calling for Congress to limit the FCC’s ancillary authority).  
 90. James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting 
It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 26 (2003). Thomas Merrill has called the Midwest Video I and 
Southwestern Cable decisions, which recognized ancillary jurisdiction over cable, “specta-
cular breaches of principle.” Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From 
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2169-70 (2004). 
 91. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1014 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 92. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 93. Weiser, supra note 43, at 48-49. 
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sequential.”94 They add that this uncertainty, coupled with the rela-
tively limited number of cases, makes “confident predictions” imposs-
ible regarding when courts will uphold ancillary jurisdiction.95
 A related aspect of the doctrine’s alleged vagueness is that its tex-
tual foundations are not altogether clear.96 This textual dispute ex-
tends to both (1) the authority to enact “ancillary” regulations in the 
first place and (2) the types of statutory provisions that can serve as 
“hooks” for those new regulations. 
 With respect to the former, the most widely accepted statutory 
source for ancillary jurisdiction is § 154(i), which has been called the 
FCC’s “ ‘necessary and proper clause.’ ”97 This statutory provision au-
thorizes the FCC to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and 
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this  
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”98
Courts have widely embraced this interpretation, although not all 
scholars have.99
 With respect to the latter, parties have also disputed whether cer-
tain statutory “hooks” provide a sufficient foundation for the exercise 
of ancillary jurisdiction. Under Southwestern Cable Co., the FCC 
must identify a foundational statutory source upon which to base its 
ancillary regulations.100 For instance, in that case, the Court upheld 
cable regulations as ancillary to the FCC’s explicit statutory authori-
ty to regulate broadcasters.101
 One of the most important controversies on this issue is whether 
Title I itself can provide the independent “hook” for the ancillary reg-
ulations authorized by § 154(i).102 The controversy stems from the 
                                                                                                                    
 94. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 217. 
 95. Id. at 219-20; see also Speta, supra note 90, at 22 (calling Title I ancillary authori-
ty “at best, uncertain”). 
 96. For example, in the recent Comcast throttling case, the parties disagreed about 
the precise textual provisions that authorized the FCC to exercise ancillary jurisdiction in 
the first place. Compare Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, In the Matter of Broadband In-
dustry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 29-31 (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Me-
morandum] (arguing that Title I cannot provide an independent source of authority), with
Letter from Marvin Ammori, Free Press, Notice of Ex Parte Presentation, Petition for Dec-
laratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy 
Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable Network Management,” WC 
Docket No. 07-52, at 9-11 (June 12, 2008) (attaching legal memorandum) (arguing that 
Title I does provide independent authority), available at http://www.freepress.net/files/ 
FP_et_al_Petition_Ex_Parte_Filing.pdf.  
 97. See, e.g., Mobile Commc’ns Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 98. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006). 
 99. For example, Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts have recently argued 
that §154 should be understood merely as an authorization to enact internal housekeeping 
procedures. Merrill & Watts, supra note 25, at 517-20. Courts, however, have never en-
dorsed their argument. 
 100. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).  
 101. Id.
 102. See, e.g., Comcast Memorandum, supra note 96, at 27-31. 
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fact that Title I does not cover a specific type of network in the way 
that Titles II and III do. Instead, Title I includes a laundry list of 
general statements regarding the FCC’s jurisdiction,103 its purpos-
es,104 and its internal procedures.105 Section 151 specifically explains 
that the FCC’s purposes include “mak[ing] available . . . rapid, effi-
cient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication 
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”106
 Thus, the precise question is whether the FCC can enact regula-
tions ancillary to the specific policy goals outlined in § 151, such as 
promoting “reasonable charges” or “rapid” service. Because terms 
like “reasonable” and “rapid” are potentially vague, “stand-alone” 
Title I ancillary jurisdiction is potentially the most expansive author-
ity, relying as it does on the broad purposes listed in § 151 rather 
than on the more specific statutory requirements in the other titles. 
Historically speaking, however, courts have generally found that 
Title I is a sufficient and independent foundation of authority. In-
deed, courts in several cases have upheld the FCC’s exercises of an-
cillary jurisdiction citing Title I alone.107
 The broader point is that the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine re-
mains controversial, and it includes a number of unsettled questions. 
The confusion surrounding the doctrine is arguably jeopardizing the 
future of ancillary jurisdiction altogether. The D.C. Circuit in particu-
lar has grown increasingly skeptical of the doctrine in recent years.108
 For these reasons, the controversy surrounding ancillary jurisdic-
tion threatens to deprive the FCC of a vital power to address the 
challenges of new technologies and convergence. Given that this 
threat arguably stems from the doctrine’s perceived incoherence, I 
argue in Part III that this “vague” and “unlimited” authority has, to 
the contrary, been relatively constrained and coherent. Before intro-
ducing this new descriptive account, however, it is important to more 
fully address why the literature’s current descriptions of ancillary ju-
risdiction are ultimately unpersuasive and inconsistent with case law.  
                                                                                                                    
 103. 47 U.S.C. § 152. 
 104. Id. § 151.  
 105. Id. § 154.  
 106. Id. § 151. 
 107. For a list of these cases, see Ex Parte Letter of John Blevins Regarding the Com-
mission’s Ancillary Jurisdiction, Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 3-
5 (Jul. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Blevins Ex Parte].  
 108. Jeffrey Silva, Appeals Court Questions FCC’s Authority on Backup Power Rule,
RCRWIRELESS (May 9, 2008), http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20080509/FREE/ 
354444178/-1/appeals-court-questions-fcc-s-authority-on-backup-power-rule.  
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III.   THE WEAKNESS OF CURRENT DESCRIPTIONS OF 
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
 In this Part, I argue that current positive accounts of the ancillary 
jurisdiction doctrine are inadequate. As explained above, few scho-
lars have attempted to provide a positive account of when courts will 
uphold the FCC’s ancillary regulations.109 The few that have at-
tempted to provide such an account contend that ancillary jurisdic-
tion can be understood in terms of (1) addressing the challenges of 
new technology; (2) the closeness of the regulations’ relationship to 
the underlying “hook”; or (3) whether the regulations contradict oth-
er provisions of the Act. While these narrative frameworks explain 
certain cases, they do not adequately describe the line of ancillary ju-
risdiction cases as a whole. 
A.   New Technology 
 One of the more potentially persuasive arguments is that courts 
uphold ancillary jurisdiction when the FCC is addressing new dy-
namic technologies. Professors Nuechterlein and Weiser, for in-
stance, write that courts are relatively more deferential to the FCC’s 
assertion of Title I ancillary jurisdiction when it involves “dealing 
sensibly with emerging and congressionally unanticipated technolo-
gies.”110 Courts too have repeatedly emphasized the challenges that 
new technologies pose in upholding broad interpretations of ancillary 
jurisdiction. For instance, in Midwest Video I (which upheld intrusive 
regulations requiring cable companies to originate video program-
ming),111 Chief Justice Burger reluctantly concurred, explaining that 
“dynamic” technology created the need for a “flexible and virtually 
open-ended” regulatory scheme.112
 At first glance, linking ancillary jurisdiction with new dynamic 
technologies seems quite reasonable. After all, the doctrine was 
largely created in response to the unanticipated rise of cable televi-
sion. Further, the Communications Act grants the FCC expansive 
authority over a wide range of technological services that were 
                                                                                                                    
 109. The most significant recent discussion of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction is con-
tained in Weiser, supra note 43. The few other articles that discuss ancillary jurisdiction at 
any length generally confine it to one section of a larger discussion. See, e.g., Crawford, su-
pra note 89, at 925-31; Speta, supra note 90, at 22-30. One notable exception is the 1982 
article by Krattenmaker and Metzger, which provides a thorough analysis of the origins of 
ancillary jurisdiction and its application to television networks. See Krattenmaker & 
Metzger, supra note 38. This article, however, is now over twenty-five years old, and its 
applicability is therefore limited because of recent developments. 
 110. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 219-20. The authors include a norma-
tive dimension in this point as well, and they add that the doctrine is uncertain. Id. at 219-23. 
 111. Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649 (1972).  
 112. Id. at 675-76. He also noted, though, that the FCC had reached the “outer limits” 
of its authority. Id. at 676.  
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changing rapidly even in 1934. Extending the doctrine to cover new 
technologies therefore seems consistent with the purpose and spirit 
of the Act. 
 The problem, however, is that the relative age of the technology at 
issue does not adequately predict when a court will uphold the FCC’s 
regulations. While courts have clearly upheld regulations in several 
cases involving unforeseen technologies, they have also upheld sev-
eral others that involved traditional technologies that were well 
known even in 1934. In short, ancillary jurisdiction has been applied 
to both old and new technologies. One example is the FCC’s direct 
regulation of television networks. While Title III of the Act explicitly 
covered broadcast stations, it did not cover the networks them-
selves.113 The reason is that the networks did not actually broadcast 
anything; instead, they provided content for their affiliate stations to 
broadcast. There is no reason, though, that Title III could not have 
been drafted to cover networks as well. After all, networks would 
have been familiar to contemporary policymakers—NBC was 
founded in 1926114 and CBS was founded just one year later.115
 Because of jurisdictional concerns, the FCC had, for decades, stre-
nuously avoided regulating networks directly.116 Things changed, 
however, when Southwestern Cable Co. opened a new door, allowing 
the FCC to reach beyond the explicit text of Title III.117 Immediately 
recognizing the logical implications of the Southwestern Cable Co. 
decision, the FCC proceeded to regulate networks directly under its 
new jurisdictional powers.118
 Another example of “regulating the old” is the FCC’s ancillary 
regulation of traditional wireline telephone networks. While several 
telephone-related cases clearly involved new technologies (e.g., Com-
puter II), several others did not. For instance, courts have recognized 
the FCC’s ancillary authority to preempt state regulation of “inside 
wiring” for telephone service,119 to require AT&T to refund proceeds 
from excessive rates of return,120 and to create the Universal Service 
                                                                                                                    
 113. Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 426. 
 114. Patrick M. Fahey, Comment, Advocacy Group Boycotting of Network Television 
Advertisers and Its Effects on Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 696 (1991). 
 115. Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natu-
ral Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 285, 302 n.89 (2004). 
 116. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 429-33. The authors illustrate 
how the FCC crafted its regulations to apply only to stations, even if the ultimate effect 
was a backdoor regulation of the networks. It was precisely this type of regulations at issue 
in NBC in 1943. 
 117. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 440-45. 
 119. See NARUC II, 880 F.2d 422, 429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 120. See Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1310, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
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Fund.121 None of these regulations covered “new” technologies in the 
sense that cable was “new.” 
 Another weakness of the technology narrative is that courts also 
have rejected several ancillary regulations of new technologies. For 
instance, although courts initially accepted the FCC’s regulation of 
cable (an unforeseen technology), they grew increasingly skeptical of 
the FCC’s actions and ultimately vacated several cable regulations in 
the mid- to late 1970s.122 Similarly, the more recent broadcast flag 
regulations quite clearly involved new dynamic technology.123 The 
D.C. Circuit, however, also rejected these regulations.124
 To be clear, new dynamic technologies have played an important 
role in the evolution of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. In fact, 
several cases can best be understood in those terms.125 My point, 
however, is that the technology narrative does not provide the most 
persuasive description of the cases taken as a whole.
B.   Closeness of the Relationship 
 Another common descriptive narrative is that courts uphold ancil-
lary regulations when they are sufficiently close to the underlying  
jurisdictional hook. Under this view, the best predictor of a court’s 
behavior is the closeness of the relationship between the ancillary 
regulation and its statutory foundation. Professor Speta explains 
that following Midwest Video II in 1979, where the Supreme Court 
rejected various cable regulations, “[a]ll subsequent affirmances of 
FCC Title I regulatory authority have depended upon showing a 
close relationship between the regulation and the FCC’s authority 
over common carriers or broadcasters.”126 Other scholars have offered 
similar arguments.127
 Similar to the technology narrative, however, the “closeness” 
narrative also lacks descriptive, and thus predictive, power. To begin, 
the standard is rather nebulous. What exactly makes a given  
                                                                                                                    
 121. See New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); su-
pra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
 122. See, e.g., Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1979); HBO, 567 F.2d 9, 17-18 
(D.C. Cir. 1977); NARUC I, 533 F.2d 601, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1976); supra note 77 and ac-
companying text.  
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. 
 124. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 125. The early regulation of cable, for instance, was largely driven by the emergence of 
new unforeseen technologies. 
 126. Speta, supra note 90, at 24-25. Professor Speta, along with Professor Glen Robin-
son, made a similar argument in the amicus brief they filed in FCC v. Comcast. Brief Ami-
cus Curiae of Professors James B. Speta and Glen O. Robinson and the Progress and Free-
dom Foundation in Support of Petitioner Comcast Corporation and Urging that the FCC’s 
Order be Vacated, at 11-15, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 2009). 
 127. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 43, at 63 (“[F]or a regulatory measure enacted under 
Title I to withstand judicial review, it must relate closely to an express statutory policy.”). 
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regulatory scheme “close” to the underlying statutory authority? Are 
there any objectively verifiable ways to assess it? The danger is  
that this type of descriptive account can easily become circular, al-
lowing observers to find “closeness” wherever courts happen to 
uphold the authority. 
 The closeness narrative is also undermined by the case law. In-
deed, several cases arguably contradict the notion that the closeness 
of the relationship is the key factor in the courts’ decisions. For in-
stance, it is difficult to reconcile the cable cases of the 1970s, Midwest 
Cable I and II, under the closeness narrative. In 1972, in Midwest 
Video I, the Court upheld extremely burdensome regulations forcing 
cable companies to produce content.128 In 1979, in Midwest Video II,
by contrast, the Court rejected relatively less-onerous replacement 
regulations requiring cable companies simply to make some channels 
available for public access.129
 More recently, the broadcast flag case, American Library Ass’n,
also undermines this narrative. Formally speaking, the court did not 
even consider the relative closeness of the relationship because it 
concluded that the broadcast flag regulations did not relate to a “ra-
dio communication” and thus fell outside the FCC’s general jurisdic-
tion under the first prong of the analysis.130 The court’s conclusion, 
though, seems strained given that the FCC has explicit jurisdiction 
not merely over transmissions, but over devices that can receive and 
forward broadcast transmissions. Section 153(33) makes clear that 
the “radio communications” over which the FCC has authority in-
cludes “all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services 
(among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of com-
munications) incidental to such transmission.”131
 Assuming then that a perceived lack of “closeness” is what actual-
ly motivated the court’s conclusion, it is still difficult to find a cohe-
rent rationale for why the broadcast flag regulation was not suffi-
ciently close to the FCC’s statutory objectives. For instance, the FCC 
has an explicit statutory responsibility to facilitate the digital televi-
sion transition.132 Without copyright protections, the FCC feared that 
“content providers [would] be reluctant to provide quality digital pro-
                                                                                                                    
 128. Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972). 
 129. Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1979). 
 130. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Although the 
analysis is not altogether clear, it appears that the court rejected the close-captioning re-
quirements in MPAA under the same theory—namely, that “programming content” fell 
outside the FCC’s general jurisdiction. MPAA, 309 F.3d 796, 802-06 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
 131. 47 U.S.C. § 153(33) (emphasis added). 
 132. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN, HOWARD SHELANSKI &
PHILIP J. WEISER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 652-53 (2d ed. 2006) (“[T]he 
[FCC] further asserted that the broadcast flag is integral to the success of the DTV transition.”). 
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gramming.”133 Accordingly, it seems difficult to devise any objective 
metrics by which these regulations were insufficiently “close” in com-
parison to other valid ancillary regulations.134
 A variation of the closeness argument is that courts uphold ancil-
lary jurisdiction when the underlying hook comes from somewhere 
other than Title I. For instance, in the recent throttling proceeding, 
Comcast made this very argument in its legal memorandum disput-
ing FCC jurisdiction over broadband network practices.135 To be a va-
lid exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, Comcast contended, the FCC 
must provide a non-Title I statutory hook.136
 Here too, though, the case law contradicts the narrative. As noted 
above, courts have upheld numerous exercises of ancillary jurisdic-
tion that were based on Title I alone, including the Computer II regu-
lations.137 In sum, while the closeness narrative is reasonable in cer-
tain instances, it fails to provide a persuasive comprehensive account 
of the courts’ actions.  
C.   Inconsistency with Other Provisions 
 A third descriptive narrative is that courts reject ancillary regula-
tions when they are inconsistent with other provisions in the Act. 
Under this view, ancillary jurisdiction can be used to fill unforeseen 
gaps, but cannot contradict or supplement explicit statutory re-
quirements. Under this view, ancillary jurisdiction might extend to 
unanticipated technologies, but not to areas where Congress has al-
ready explicitly spoken. Professors Nuechterlein and Weiser, for in-
stance, write that courts look disfavorably upon attempts to “sup-
plement[] the established statutory schemes.”138
 The case law, however, illustrates that courts have upheld ancil-
lary regulations that essentially rewrite, and even blatantly contra-
dict, existing statutory schemes. In some cases, the regulations simp-
                                                                                                                    
 133. Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 FCC Rcd 23,550, 23,565-66 (2003) (re-
port and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking).  
 134. The D.C. Circuit relied heavily on the claim that it was the FCC’s first use of an-
cillary jurisdiction over equipment manufacturers. See Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 695. 
In addition to being inconsistent with the language of § 153(33) noted above, it also ap-
pears inconsistent with the FCC’s prior regulations of equipment. See Penina Michlin, 
Note, The Broadcast Flag and the Scope of the FCC’s Ancillary Jurisdiction: Protecting the 
Digital Future, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 919-20 (2005) (providing examples of equip-
ment FCC has historically regulated). 
 135. See Comcast Memorandum, supra note 96, at 27-31. 
 136. See, e.g., id.
 137. See Blevins Ex Parte, supra note 107, at 3-5. 
 138. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 219-20 (“[C]ourts have enforced [limits 
on the jurisdiction] mostly when those rules are in tension with other legal principles codi-
fied elsewhere.”). 
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ly supplement existing requirements.139 In several others, however, 
the FCC’s regulations are hard to describe as anything other than 
end-runs around the Act’s explicit requirements. In short, some an-
cillary regulations supplant more explicit statutory provisions rather 
than merely supplementing them. 
 One good example of this dynamic is a line of cases involving rate-
of-return and interconnection regulations on telephone carriers. In 
the first of these, Nader v. FCC, the court considered whether the 
FCC had the authority to impose rate of return provisions.140 While § 
205 of the Communications Act authorizes the FCC to prescribe “rea-
sonable charge[s],”141 it does not mention “rates of return,” which lim-
it the amount of fees that a regulated telephone carrier may charge 
its customers. For instance, the FCC might set a maximum rate of 
return of eight percent, which means that a carrier can recover from 
customers the amount of the carrier’s costs plus an additional eight 
percent return on those costs. While courts have acknowledged that § 
205 of the Communications Act does not explicitly authorize the FCC 
to establish rates of return, they nonetheless allowed the FCC to 
enact them under its § 154 ancillary authority.142
 While rate of return regulations are best understood as statutory 
supplements, other FCC ancillary regulations in this area more 
clearly contradict the Act. For instance, in Lincoln Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. FCC, the FCC had ordered the incumbent carrier (Lin-
coln) to file a tariff outlining the interconnection charges that would 
apply to MCI, its new competitor.143 Section 203, however, explicitly 
stated that “connecting carriers” like Lincoln did not have to file in-
terconnection tariffs.144 Despite this fairly clear statutory exemption 
from tariff requirements, the court nonetheless concluded that the 
FCC had ancillary jurisdiction to impose the tariff requirement upon 
Lincoln: “[W]hile Section 203(a) did not grant the Commission the 
requisite authority for its action, Section 154(i) did.”145 Section 203, 
however, did more than simply fail to grant power. It explicitly 
                                                                                                                    
 139. Even in this situation, the ancillary regulations would theoretically be subject to 
an expressio unius argument. See supra note 42. 
 140. Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 203-05 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 141. 47 U.S.C. § 205 (2006). 
 142. See, e.g., Nader, 520 F.2d at 203 (“Although section 205 does not authorize the 
Commission to prescribe rates of return, we think that any literal interpretation would be 
overly simplistic. . . . [O]ur inquiry is whether the . . . rate of return prescription is proper 
under section 4(i).”). 
 143. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 144. Id. at 1108. 
 145. Id. at 1108-09. 
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stated the opposite—§ 203 flatly exempted connecting carriers from 
this requirement.146
 Another example comes from New England Telephone &  
Telegraph Co. v. FCC.147 In this case, the FCC ordered carriers to  
issue refunds to customers for excessive rate of return charges that 
had been in place for years.148 Arguing that the FCC was acting ille-
gally, the carriers asserted that § 204 was the only provision that  
authorized refunds and that it applied only to “new” or “revised” 
rates, not to longstanding ones (thus, they claimed applying ancillary 
jurisdiction would contradict § 204).149 Conceding that § 204 did not 
apply,150 the court nonetheless upheld the refund under the FCC’s 
ancillary authority.151
D.   Unlimited Power 
 Although it merits only a brief discussion, any argument that the 
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction is best described as an unlimited power 
is also inaccurate. Courts have rejected the FCC’s ancillary regula-
tions on several occasions, particularly the older cable regulations.152
 A related but potentially stronger argument is that there is simp-
ly no logic to the ancillary jurisdiction cases. Admittedly, the courts’ 
inconsistent approach to the FCC’s cable regulations can give the ap-
pearance that the doctrine is wholly inconsistent. The next Part, 
however, refutes this characterization and provides a coherent de-
scriptive account of the ancillary cases as a whole. 
IV.   ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AS COMPETITION PROMOTION:
A NEW DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK
 This Part provides a new comprehensive account of the FCC’s an-
cillary jurisdiction as interpreted by courts. Specifically, I argue that 
ancillary jurisdiction is best understood as a competition-promotion
doctrine. The precise “competition” analyzed here is primarily in 
                                                                                                                    
 146. Id. at 1108; see also 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1976). Another example of an inconsisten-
cy is Mobile Communications Corp. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1996), discussed infra
in Part IV. Briefly, the FCC in that case required a carrier to pay for a license it had pre-
viously allocated for free despite the tension with more explicit statutory licensing provi-
sions. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.  
 147. 826 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 148. Id. at 1103-04. 
 149. Id. at 1107-08 (“Petitioners nevertheless insist that a refund remedy is inconsis-
tent with the Act, and therefore an inappropriate exercise of power under section 4(i), be-
cause it amounts to retroactive ratemaking.”). 
 150. Id. at 1107 (“As petitioners observe, section 204 is the only provision of the Act 
explicitly to mention refunds, and it does not apply to the circumstances of this case.”). 
 151. Id. at 1107-08. 
 152. See, e.g., Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); HBO, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
NARUC I, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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markets where vertical leveraging concerns exist. As I illustrate be-
low, courts generally defer to the FCC’s ancillary regulations when 
the regulations are designed to facilitate market competition in this 
context, particularly when the FCC acts to prevent owners of under-
lying physical facilities from leveraging that control to affect adjacent 
markets that depend upon access to those facilities. Courts have giv-
en the FCC less deference, however, when the FCC acts to promote 
other goals, such as social ones. 
 In this Part, I first examine cases where courts have upheld  
the FCC’s ancillary regulations, arguing that the competition frame-
work best explains the greatest number of them. I next examine cas-
es where courts have rejected the FCC’s ancillary regulations, noting 
that these regulations primarily served goals other than competition 
promotion. Next, using cable as a case study, I illustrate how the 
competition framework best explains the seemingly incoherent line  
of cable regulation cases from the 1970s.153 Finally, I examine the  
few cases that arguably do not fit within this descriptive framework. 
While no framework can persuasively reconcile every single case,  
I argue that the competition-promotion framework provides  
significantly more descriptive power than any of the frameworks 
listed in Part III. 
A.   Cases Upholding Ancillary Jurisdiction 
 This Section illustrates why the competition-promotion frame-
work best explains most of the cases where courts have upheld ancil-
lary regulations. Rather than tediously describing each individual 
case, I have grouped them thematically into two categories—
specifically, cases where the FCC acted (1) to prevent providers from 
leveraging perceived market power in one market to act anticompeti-
tively in another and (2) to level the competitive playing field among 
parties that did not have market power. In both categories, the 
courts used market-promotion language and rationales in upholding 
the FCC’s ancillary regulations. 
1.   Preventing Vertical Leveraging 
 In this first category of cases, the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction reg-
ulations were aimed primarily at providers with perceived market 
power—namely, incumbent telephone carriers and national televi-
sion networks. Turning first to the telephone cases, one of the FCC’s 
animating concerns here involved the fear that telephone carriers 
                                                                                                                    
 153. To preview the argument, I will contend that courts initially upheld the cases be-
cause of concerns about cable’s perceived “unfair” competitive advantage. Later, however, 
when the regulations became more socially focused (and more flagrantly anti-cable), courts 
became more skeptical. 
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would leverage control of either their underlying physical facilities or 
their monopoly status to act anticompetitively in adjacent markets.  
 The Computer Inquiry cases illustrate these concerns well.154 The 
rise of data processing and computer services created at least two 
regulatory problems for policymakers. First, these services depended 
upon access to the incumbent carriers’ network facilities.155 If the 
carriers limited that access or significantly raised access costs, it 
could slow the growth of these new services. Second, carriers enter-
ing these new data markets themselves could potentially gain a com-
petitive advantage by exploiting their monopoly to cross-subsidize 
their service offerings.156 In other words, carriers could raise rates in 
the regulated, noncompetitive voice markets to slash prices in the 
more competitive data-processing markets. 
 The FCC’s Computer I and II decisions specifically responded to 
these concerns. Computer I imposed a structural separation require-
ment, forcing carriers that offered data-processing services to create 
a wholly separate subsidiary with separate equipment and account-
ing procedures.157 Computer II refined and clarified this requirement, 
and it also divided communications services into “basic” common car-
rier services and “enhanced” unregulated ones.158 This division 
helped ensure that emerging “enhanced” services would enjoy guar-
anteed access to “basic” transport services. As Robert Cannon has 
explained, the promotion of markets and the protection from vertical 
leveraging was the FCC’s animating concern throughout: 
The first principles laid down in Computer I are consistently fol-
lowed throughout the entire proceeding. How these first principles 
are applied and the outcome that is produced may be different, but 
the Computer Inquiries are consistently concerned about markets. 
The data processing market is highly competitive and innovative 
and demonstrates no need for regulation. The data processing 
market, however, is dependent upon the communications market. 
The communications companies are both a bottleneck supplier of 
services and a competitor in the data processing market. There-
fore, strict safeguards were put into place in order to restrain the 
                                                                                                                    
 154. See supra note 55. 
 155. See, e.g., Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 428 (1980) (final decision) (noting “ever in-
creasing dependence upon common carrier transmission facilities in the movement  
of information”). 
 156. See, e.g., Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 299 (1970) (tentative decision of the com-
mission) (“We recognize . . . that the provision of other services and, particularly data 
processing services by common carriers, may give rise to critical problems of unfair compe-
tition and cross-subsidy.”). 
 157. See id. at 302-03. 
 158. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 428-30. 
614 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:585 
market power of the communications company and for the benefit 
of the data processing market.159
 Unsurprisingly, in upholding the FCC’s ancillary authority to 
adopt the Computer I and II regulations, courts relied on these same 
competition-promotion rationales. For instance, in upholding Com-
puter II, the D.C. Circuit in Computer and Communications Industry 
Ass’n v. FCC explained as follows: “This [regulation] was based upon 
detailed findings on AT & T’s market power and its ability to under-
write its competitive offerings with profits from its monopoly  
services. We believe this conclusion is well founded.”160 Years earlier, 
the Second Circuit in GTE Service Corp. v. FCC had offered similar 
market-based explanations in upholding Computer I’s original struc-
tural separation.161
 More generally, courts have upheld numerous ancillary regula-
tions aimed at preventing anticompetitive conduct by incumbent tel-
ephone carriers who own legacy infrastructure that was subsidized 
during monopoly eras. In this context, courts have upheld FCC ancil-
lary regulations that (1) preempted state regulations of terminal 
equipment;162 (2) established interim interconnection rates for MCI (a 
competitive carrier);163 (3) restricted the ability of phone carriers to 
provide cable service in local areas;164 (4) required incumbent carriers 
to refund excessive fees to customers;165 and (5) preempted state reg-
ulation of inside wiring for telephone networks.166 Further, in dicta, 
courts also have recognized the FCC’s authority to impose require-
ments on private Title I “dark fiber” offerings.167
 The common thread running through all of these cases is the fear 
that incumbent carriers could take advantage of either their facilities 
                                                                                                                    
 159. Cannon, supra note 56, at 180. 
 160. Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(citation omitted). 
 161. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 732 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Specifically, the Com-
mission was concerned that data processing costs would be passed on directly or indirectly 
to the public consumer of telephone services and that revenues derived from common car-
rier services would be used to subsidize data processing services.”). The Second Circuit, 
however, also struck down part of Computer I. In the next Section, I attempt to reconcile 
the GTE court’s actions under the competition framework. 
 162. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1051 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding  
preemption of state regulation of terminal equipment despite “absence of explicit  
statutory authorization”). 
 163. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 164. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 165. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 166. NARUC II, 880 F.2d 422, 429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 167. E.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he 
Commission has ancillary jurisdiction over private offerings of common carriers under sec-
tion 152 . . . .”). Dark fiber refers to high-speed transmission lines that have not yet been 
activated or “lit,” but that could be. See id. at 1478. 
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or their ability to cross-subsidize services to inhibit market competi-
tion. Indeed, courts explicitly note these concerns in their opinions.  
 For instance, in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest, the court 
upheld the FCC’s authority to prevent phone carriers from providing 
cable service in their local areas.168 In doing so, the court noted the 
FCC’s concern that carriers might leverage their control of underly-
ing facilities to undermine cable competition.169 Specifically, the court 
explained that the FCC was protecting cable competitors that “rely 
on the telephone companies for either construction and lease of 
channel facilities or for the use of poles for the construction of their 
own facilities.”170
 The D.C. Circuit offered similar arguments in Lincoln Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., which upheld interconnection tariff rates, primarily 
for the new upstart MCI.171 The court’s language makes it clear that 
competition concerns motivated the extension of ancillary jurisdic-
tion here, even though the ancillary regulation itself was likely in-
consistent with a separate statutory provision: 
LT&T and MCI are . . . bitter rivals who are at loggerheads. It is in 
LT&T’s interest to limit the competition posed by MCI, or any oth-
er specialized carrier. While we in no way mean to intimate that 
LT&T is attempting to set unreasonable terms and conditions, we 
do observe that LT&T’s incentive to do so is great. The Commis-
sion properly perceived the need for close supervision and took the 
necessary course of action . . . .172
 Moving beyond telephone carriers, anticompetitive concerns also 
explain the FCC’s regulations of television networks. While other 
scholars have offered more comprehensive historical accounts of 
broadcasting, it is sufficient for purposes here to understand the dif-
ference between networks and stations. Generally speaking, individ-
ual local stations (the ones that actually broadcast) affiliate with a 
national network, which in turn provides the station with program-
ming content. The networks themselves, though, generally do not 
broadcast signals over the air.173
 From the very beginning, the FCC was concerned that networks 
had market power and would leverage that control to influence adja-
cent markets such as programming content. However, because the 
FCC could not regulate the networks directly under Title III, the 
                                                                                                                    
 168. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 449 F.2d at 850. 
 169. See id. at 851. 
 170. Id.
 171. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 172. Id. at 1109. On the statutory inconsistency, see supra notes 143-46 and accompa-
nying text. 
 173. For an overview of these traditional business relationships, see Krattenmaker & 
Metzger, supra note 38, at 408-11. 
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FCC instead tailored its regulations to apply only to the stations. In 
essence, these were backdoor regulations of networks that were 
structured to limit the types of agreements that stations could enter.174
 After Southwestern Cable Co. changed the regulatory landscape 
by introducing ancillary jurisdiction, the FCC immediately applied it 
to the networks directly. The resulting regulations included the so-
called “fin-syn” rules, which sharply limited the networks’ ability to 
take financial interests in programming companies and to enter the 
syndication market.175 In upholding the FCC’s regulations, the 
Second Circuit echoed the concerns that networks might otherwise 
act anticompetitively in these markets.176
2.   Leveling the Competitive Playing Field 
 In this smaller category of cases, the FCC’s ancillary regulations 
were designed to promote competitive neutrality. Unlike in the pre-
vious category, the parties here (wireless companies and early cable 
providers) were not perceived to have market power.  
 Turning first to wireless services, the ancillary regulation upheld 
in Mobile Communications Corp. of America v. FCC177 is best unders-
tood as an attempt to level the competitive playing field. There, the 
FCC had originally assigned a wireless (PCS) license to a carrier 
(Mtel) for free.178 However, as wireless service grew in the 1990s, the 
FCC became concerned that the free PCS license would give Mtel an 
unfair competitive advantage.179 It thus reversed its previous decision 
and required Mtel to pay for the license.180 Interestingly, the reversal 
also seemed to violate a specific statutory provision governing wire-
less license fees.181
 The D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld the regulation.182 In doing so, 
the court echoed the same competitive concerns that had motivated 
the FCC to rescind the free license. Specifically, the court outlined in 
                                                                                                                    
 174. See id. at 429-33. 
 175. See Christian, supra note 65, at 107-09. 
 176. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC442 F.2d 470, 486-87 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[T]he 
syndication rule is aimed at decreasing network dominance and curbing potential competi-
tive restraints.”). 
 177. 77 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir 1996). 
 178. Id. at 1402.  
 179. Application of Nationwide Wireless Network Corp., 9 F.C.C.R. 3635, 3639 (1994) 
(memorandum opinion and order) (“[W]e are concerned that the award of a free license to 
[the carrier] would create an unfair competitive advantage . . . .”). 
 180. Id. at 3640.
 181. The carrier had noted that the Communications Act had specific provisions go-
verning administrative fees and thus raised an expressio unius argument. Mobile 
Commc’ns Corp. of Am., 77 F.3d at 1404-05. 
 182. Id. at 1406.  
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detail the various reasons why rival providers would be unfairly 
harmed by Mtel’s free PCS license.183
 In sum, the competition-promotion framework reconciles far more 
of the cases above than the descriptive frameworks listed in Part III. 
For instance, courts upheld cases involving both new technologies 
(Computer I) and old ones (television network regulations). In addi-
tion, some of these regulations were flatly inconsistent with other 
statutory provisions. Competition promotion, by contrast, is the 
common thread running through all of these cases. 
B.   Cases Rejecting Ancillary Jurisdiction 
 The competition-promotion framework also provides the best ex-
planation for the cases where courts rejected the FCC’s exercises of 
ancillary jurisdiction. Often, the rejected regulations were designed 
to promote social goals (as opposed to market competition). Other “re-
jected” cases, however, are more difficult to classify under one con-
ceptual umbrella, though they are generally consistent with a compe-
tition-promotion descriptive framework.  
1.   Noneconomic Goals 
 Courts have been most likely to reject ancillary regulations when 
the underlying regulatory goal is primarily social in nature. Of 
course, there is no bright conceptual line separating economic goals 
from social goals. Social goals often have economic dimensions, and 
vice versa. That said, the less that the FCC’s regulatory objectives 
are aimed at promoting competition (and preventing vertical leverag-
ing in particular), the more skeptical courts become. 
 Two recent D.C. Circuit decisions vacating the FCC’s ancillary 
regulations—MPAA (2002) and American Library Ass’n (2005)—
illustrate the courts’ skepticism of noneconomic goals.184 In MPAA,
the FCC required television broadcasters to provide “video descrip-
tions” for the hearing impaired.185 As laudable as this goal might 
have been, it quite clearly had little to do with market competition. 
Similarly, the broadcast flag regulations at issue in American Library 
Ass’n were primarily about preventing copyright infringement.186
                                                                                                                    
 183. Id. at 1405-06 (noting competitive disadvantage of “would-be license holders”). 
 184. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (vacating broadcast 
flag regulations); MPAA, 309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating “video descrip-
tion” requirements). 
 185. MPAA, 309 F.3d at 798. 
 186. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 693-94. While protecting copyright has both eco-
nomic and social dimensions, its protection is arguably less motivated by systematic efforts 
to facilitate markets by, for instance, preventing vertical leveraging.
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 The courts in these cases, however, did not speak in terms of so-
cial versus economic goals, but instead offered other reasons for re-
jecting the FCC’s regulations. For instance, in MPAA, the court 
stressed that the FCC was trying to illegally reach “content,” which 
triggered First Amendment concerns.187 In addition, the FCC’s  
regulations appeared to contradict the statutory scheme regarding 
video descriptions.188 In American Library Ass’n, the court empha-
sized that the FCC was extending regulations to device manufactur-
ers for the first time.189 It also held that the broadcast flag regula-
tions did not cover “transmission[s]” and thus fell outside the FCC’s 
general jurisdiction.190
 There are reasons to be skeptical, however, that these factors 
were motivating the court’s decisions. As explained earlier, the 
court’s conclusions in the broadcast flag case are arguably inconsis-
tent with both the Act and precedent.191 And though the video de-
scription rules arguably contradicted other provisions of the Act, we 
have seen that courts often endorse ancillary regulations anyway. 
Further, some of the concerns the courts cited could apply just as 
easily to other cases where the courts upheld ancillary jurisdiction. 
For instance, the FCC’s limitations on television networks’ associa-
tion with programming potentially implicated both content and First 
Amendment concerns. Despite these potential similarities, the more 
competition-oriented regulations were upheld, while the more social-
ly oriented regulations in the two more recent cases were not. 
2.   Miscellaneous Cases 
 Courts have also rejected ancillary regulations in a handful of 
other cases, one of which (involving the construction of the Sears 
Tower) quite clearly had no procompetition objective.192 In two others, 
though, the cases appear at first glance to be in tension with the de-
scriptive framework I have outlined.  
 In the first, California v. FCC, the Ninth Circuit vacated several 
of the FCC’s Computer III regulations,193 which had relaxed Comput-
                                                                                                                    
 187. MPAA, 309 F.3d at 805 (“One of the reasons why § 1 has not been construed to al-
low the FCC to regulate programming content is because such regulations invariably raise 
First Amendment issues.”). 
 188. See id. at 802 (finding that 47 U.S.C. § 713 barred FCC’s regulations). 
 189. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 695. 
 190. Id. at 704-05. 
 191. See supra note 134. 
 192. Ill. Citizens. Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 1397, 1398-99 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(holding that FCC lacked jurisdiction to regulate construction of the Sears Tower to pre-
vent signal interference). The FCC had denied that it had the authority to act, and it was 
sued on that basis. Id.
 193. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing Computer III
in part). 
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er II’s structural separation requirements. Upon close review, how-
ever, California arguably has little relevance to the ancillary juris-
diction doctrine. For one, the court rejected the regulations for other 
reasons—namely, because they were deemed arbitrary and capri-
cious and an intrusion on state jurisdiction.  
 To the extent that the case is relevant to an ancillary jurisdiction 
analysis, it arguably supports the competition-promotion framework. 
The regulations in California relaxed the competitive safeguards that 
Computer II had erected. Indeed, the court here seemed concerned 
that the regulations would harm competition in these markets by 
prematurely removing the structural separations.194
 The second case, GTE Service Corp. v. FCC,195 is more problemat-
ic. As explained above, GTE upheld the original Computer I struc-
tural separation between carriers and their data-processing subsidi-
aries. On this level, GTE is clearly consistent with the competition 
framework. However, GTE went on to vacate other Computer I regu-
lations that imposed requirements directly upon the data-processing 
subsidiaries themselves (including limitations on contracting with 
the affiliated carrier).196 The court concluded that the FCC was im-
properly reaching into a competitive market that it had previously 
declined to regulate.197
 This decision, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
framework given that the data-processing market alone (isolated 
from the carrier facilities) was competitive and not threatened by an-
ticompetitive conduct. That said, the court quite clearly was not de-
ferring to the FCC’s economic judgment (in this respect, this part of 
the case does not fit well within the framework). 
C.   Cable Regulation: A Case Study 
 One challenge in developing a descriptive framework is reconcil-
ing the line of cases reviewing the FCC’s ancillary regulations of ca-
ble in the 1960s and 1970s (ancillary regulations became unneces-
sary after Congress added Title VI in 1984). These cases are, to put it 
mildly, not a model of coherence. The competition-promotion frame-
work, however, provides the most coherence possible, both in terms 
of explaining the cases themselves and in illustrating their relation-
ship to the other ancillary jurisdiction cases. In particular, the 
                                                                                                                    
 194. Id. at 1228-29 (“[T]he FCC provided no record support that any of the so-called 
changes were relevant to its regulatory task of protecting captive ratepayers and competi-
tors against the damaging effects of cross-subsidization.”). 
 195. 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).  
 196. Id. at 733. 
 197. See id. at 733-34. 
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framework best accounts for the cases’ evolution, which was toward 
competition promotion.  
 At first glance, the cable cases seem incoherent, particularly at 
the Supreme Court level. Consider, for instance, Midwest Video I 
(1972) versus Midwest Video II (1979)—two Supreme Court cases 
that arguably contradict each other. In Midwest I, the Court upheld 
extremely intrusive regulations requiring cable companies to create 
their own programming content. These regulations, however, were 
soon replaced with relatively less-intrusive “access” regulations, 
which required cable companies to set aside channels for third par-
ties (e.g., public, government). In Midwest II, however, the Court va-
cated these less-intrusive regulations.198
 While the cases seem to contradict each other, some coherence 
emerges when we look not merely at Supreme Court cases but at the 
larger context of cable cases as a whole during this period. Below is 
the timeline of the most important cable ancillary cases and how the 
courts ruled. 
TABLE 1 
YEAR CASE COURT RESULT
1968 Southwestern Cable Supreme Court Upheld
1972 Midwest Video I Supreme Court Upheld (plurality)
1975 NARUC DC Circuit Rejected
1977 HBO DC Circuit Rejected
1979 Midwest Video II Supreme Court Rejected
From this perspective, a trend emerges—courts grew less deferential 
to the FCC’s cable regulations through time. And though courts of-
fered various reasons for their skepticism, I will argue that this trend 
can be best explained within the competition-promotion framework.  
 Of course, the more familiar story of early cable regulation is that 
the FCC used its initial ancillary authority to protect an incumbent 
industry from competition.199 Under this view, the FCC’s regulations 
represent agency capture at its worst. While subsequent cable regu-
lations clearly support that view, the original motivations were argu-
ably more ambiguous. More precisely, it is plausible to see how 
                                                                                                                    
198. Compare Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972), with Midwest Video II, 440 
U.S. 689, 695-96 (1979). Dissenting in Midwest Video II, Justice Stevens noted the logical 
inconsistency of upholding less-intrusive regulations than the Court rejected in Midwest 
Video I. See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 709-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 199. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Televi-
sion, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1688 (2003) (“The desire to protect incumbents also determined 
the FCC’s response to the emergence of cable television.”). 
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courts might have perceived the FCC’s initial regulations as more 
benign efforts to promote competitive neutrality.  
 In the initial case, Southwestern Cable, courts arguably saw the 
FCC as acting to limit what it perceived to be cable’s unfair competi-
tive advantages with respect to broadcasters. From a contemporary 
perspective, the original behavior at issue in Southwestern Cable Co.
was problematic in a couple of ways. First, cable service relied upon 
appropriating broadcasters’ transmission signals (for which they paid 
nothing).200 Second, cable companies were also importing broadcast 
programming (often identical programming) from distant markets 
that otherwise could not be seen in the local community.201 The FCC’s 
ultimate regulations responded to these specific concerns. 
 Clearly, the FCC’s actions both helped broadcasters and served 
social goals such as protecting free over-the-air television. However, 
the regulations also had a sincerely procompetition dimension. Spe-
cifically, the FCC aimed to eliminate cable’s perceived unfair compet-
itive advantage stemming from its reliance on broadcast retransmis-
sions. The HBO court, in distinguishing Southwestern Cable to va-
cate cable regulations, explained this thinking: 
What was considered unfair by the Commission in the distant sig-
nal cases was that cable was competing with local broadcasters by 
bringing into the local area identical programming plucked out of 
the air from distant stations. Because local broadcasters had to 
pay copyright royalties for this material and cable did not, cable 
was thought to have an unfair advantage.202
 Over time, though, the courts grew increasingly skeptical of, and 
eventually rejected, subsequent regulations that either had noneco-
nomic objectives or represented more blatant anticompetitive efforts 
to protect incumbent broadcasters. Nominally, the objectives were 
more socially oriented (e.g., promoting programming diversity, pro-
tecting the quality of free programming). For instance, the channel 
“access” requirements struck down in Midwest Video II were nomi-
nally adopted to promote programming diversity and self-
                                                                                                                    
200. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-62 (1968) (noting that cable 
providers “do not recompense producers or broadcasters for use of the programming which 
they receive and redistribute”). 
 201. Id. at 163 (“[Cable providers] may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant 
stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae. As the number and size of [cable] sys-
tems have increased, their principal function has more frequently become the importation 
of distant signals.”). 
 202. HBO, 567 F.2d 9, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The HBO court, however, disagreed with 
the FCC’s argument that Southwestern Cable prevented unfair competition. Id. at 41. 
However, the court noted that, even if Southwestern Cable should read that way, the com-
petitive concerns in that case were different than in the case before it. Id at 41-42.  
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expression.203 Similarly, in HBO, the FCC limited the types of pro-
grams that cable companies could charge the public to see. The con-
cern was that the most popular programs would be “siphon[ed]” away 
from free broadcast television, thus lowering its quality (particularly 
for lower-income viewers).204 Finally, in NARUC, the court struck 
down regulations that had quite literally no relation to video or 
broadcasting competition—the regulations dealt with two-way non-
video communications.205
 While these regulations were nominally social, the more cynical 
interpretation is that they intentionally suppressed competition by 
burdening cable. Indeed, if you scratch beneath the surface of the 
courts’ opinions, they seemed increasingly to view these “social” regu-
lations as blatant efforts to stifle cable competition to protect incum-
bent broadcasters. For instance, the court in HBO noted cable’s con-
cerns that the FCC was trying to “snuff out pay cable” program-
ming.206 The court added the following: 
[I]t is clear that [the regulations’] thrust is to prevent any competi-
tion by pay cable entrepreneurs for film or sports material that ei-
ther has been shown on conventional television or is likely to be 
shown there. How such an effect furthers any legitimate goal of 
the Communications Act is not clear.207
Other courts raised similar concerns. In Midwest Video II, the  
Eighth Circuit all but accused the FCC of being “captured” by in-
cumbent broadcasters.208
 The one cable case, however, that does not fit within this narra-
tive is Midwest Video I, where the Court upheld regulations requir-
                                                                                                                    
 203. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the 
Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 76.251, 
59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 (1976) (report and order) (explaining that channel access regulations 
will “result in the opening of new outlets for local expression, aid in the promotion of  
diversity in television programming, . . . aid in the functioning of democratic institutions, 
and improve the informational and educational communications resources of cable televi-
sion communities”). 
 204. HBO, 567 F.2d at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, one of the 
judges called for limiting the FCC’s authority in this area strictly to promoting competitive 
neutrality. See id. at 28 n.* (“Judge MacKinnon is of the view that the FCC’s jurisdiction to 
regulate cablecasting in the interests of the broadcasting industry is restricted to instances 
where the cable stations substantially rely on broadcast signals or their activities amount 
to unfair competition.”). 
 205. NARUC I, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
 206. See HBO, 567 F.2d at 25. 
 207. Id. at 28 (citation omitted). 
 208. Midwest Video II, 571 F.2d 1025, 1030 n.8 (8th Cir. 1978) (“Whether agencies be-
come captives of their regulates, . . . the wisdom and implications to social progress of a 
regulatory system that enlists the power of government to preserve established industry 
against new technological competition, as distinguished from reliance on consumer prefe-
rence at a perceived risk of market chaos, is a matter for the Congress, not the courts.”). 
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ing cable companies to create their own programming content.209 The 
regulatory objections here were not only social, but most likely anti-
competitive as well.  
 There are several reasons, however, why Midwest Video I under-
mines the descriptive framework less than it might appear. First, 
Midwest Video I marked the beginning of federal courts’ skepticism. 
The Court in Midwest Video I upheld the regulations in a plurality 
opinion that depended on a reluctant concurrence from Chief Justice 
Burger who warned that the FCC had “strain[ed] the outer limits” of 
its ancillary authority.210 Second, the logic of Midwest Video II argu-
ably overruled the earlier case. Third, Midwest Video I was a rela-
tively early ancillary jurisdiction case in which the Court was still 
working out the doctrine’s contours. As the table above shows, 
though, courts steadily grew skeptical of the types of regulations at 
issue in Midwest Video I. Thus, even if Midwest Video I itself pro-
vides little support, the broader evolution of the case law does. 
 In sum, the competition framework illustrates why the cable cases 
are not necessarily an incoherent mess after all. Of course, the narra-
tive is not perfect, and courts did offer wide-ranging and often incon-
sistent rationales in upholding and rejecting cases. But when we look 
closely at both of the cases as a whole and the types of regulations at 
issue, a clearer picture emerges. 
D.   Objections 
 Having laid out the descriptive framework, I turn now to potential 
objections. The first is simply that the narrative does not reconcile 
every single ancillary jurisdiction case. In this respect, it suffers from 
the same weaknesses as the ones I critiqued in Part III.  
 Admittedly, the framework cannot adequately account for every 
case—it is probably unrealistic to think that any narrative could. 
However, the framework reconciles significantly more cases than any 
other account could or has. In doing so, it illustrates why the doctrine 
has far more coherence and limitations than previously believed. 
Further, the cases that appear to contradict the narrative, like Mid-
west Video I and California v. FCC, actually have limited relevance 
or even reinforce it.  
 That said, there are admittedly a small number of cases that 
simply do not fit. For instance, the FCC’s creation of the Universal 
Service Fund (USF) is arguably unrelated to competition promotion. 
Similarly, the initial case upholding the FCC’s ancillary authority to 
                                                                                                                    
 209. See Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972). 
 210. Id. at 675-76 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result). 
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establish rates of return, Nader v. FCC,211 seemed to benefit AT&T 
rather than its competitors. In that case, the FCC lowered AT&T’s 
proposed rate of return, but not low enough to suit the company’s 
competitors, who then petitioned courts to vacate it (unsuccessfully).212
 Even these cases, however, arguably reinforce the narrative—or, 
at the least, do not contradict it. The creation of the USF, for exam-
ple, was one piece of a larger scheme to liberalize and restructure the 
long-distance market.213 So while the USF regulations themselves do 
not necessarily promote competition, they were part of, and enabled, 
the larger regulatory reform. Similarly, in Nader, the authority at is-
sue (the FCC’s authority to set rates of return) was intimately tied to 
AT&T’s monopoly status. Notably, the FCC did in fact lower AT&T’s 
proposed rate of return.214 While reasonable minds can disagree on 
the wisdom of rate-of-return regulations, these regulations were mo-
tivated in some sense to prevent incumbent carriers from charging 
excessive rates. But again, even assuming these cases ultimately 
contradict the descriptive narrative that I have proposed, that narra-
tive nonetheless reconciles significantly more cases than the other 
narratives have or can. 
 A second concern is that focusing on cases, as opposed to FCC or-
ders, is a misguided approach. After all, the cases represent only a 
fraction of the instances in which the FCC has exercised its ancillary 
jurisdiction. Essentially, I am only reviewing instances in which the 
ancillary jurisdiction was challenged through litigation. In addition, 
one may argue that the cases themselves are too small a subset from 
which to make meaningful inductions.  
 Focusing on cases does, however, have several important advan-
tages. For one, cases more accurately reflect when the FCC is actual-
ly relying on its ancillary jurisdiction, as opposed to merely citing it 
within a laundry list of potential sources of authority. If anything, re-
lying on challenged cases strengthens the analysis because it pre-
sumably involves the FCC’s weakest claims of ancillary authority. 
Otherwise, parties might not have invested the resources to litigate 
these regulations. The fact that courts have overwhelmingly affirmed 
the FCC regulations within this particular subset of challenged cases 
when they promote competition is itself telling.  
 In addition, cases provide a more manageable and easily verifiable 
subset for analysis. While there are not an overwhelming number of 
                                                                                                                    
 211. 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 212. See id. at 186-87. 
 213. Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“This case concerns 
part of the Commission’s attempt to use its power to allocate costs between federal and 
state jurisdictions in order to cushion the transition to a competitive long-distance commu-
nications market.”). 
 214. Nader, 520 F.2d at 186-87. 
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cases, there are enough from which to draw informed conclusions. 
Further, the ancillary jurisdiction authority is ultimately as broad as 
courts say it is. To know its scope, we must necessarily examine how 
courts have treated it. The competition-promotion framework  
represents a significant improvement on the existing descriptive  
understanding of a doctrine often criticized as vague or even unli-
mited. The next Part, by contrast, examines what courts should do 
going forward.215
V.   ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AS COMPETITION PROMOTION: A
NORMATIVE PROPOSAL
 The fact that courts have traditionally upheld exercises of ancil-
lary jurisdiction in the circumstances described above does not, in 
and of itself, normatively justify adopting the framework. Indeed, 
given that courts’ conclusions are not dictated by the text of § 154(i), 
they are arguably best understood as policy preferences. These policy 
preferences, however, are sound and should be more formally incor-
porated into courts’ doctrinal analysis (or, even better, in future leg-
islation or regulation). 
 Accordingly, this Part argues that courts and other policymakers 
should adopt the competition-promotion framework in reviewing and 
crafting the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction authority. Consistent with 
past practice, courts should uphold exercises of ancillary authority 
that promote competition and prevent anticompetitive behavior, pri-
marily where vertical leveraging concerns exist.216 Similarly, courts 
should reject attempts to use ancillary jurisdiction for other noneco-
nomic objectives.  
 This Part first offers several justifications for adopting this nor-
mative approach. Broadly speaking, the most important normative 
benefits of the competition-promotion framework are that it would 
impose a coherent limit on the FCC’s authority, while simultaneously 
providing a powerful ex ante restraint on agency capture. Expanding 
                                                                                                                    
 215. One could disagree with the normative proposals that follow in Part V while 
agreeing with the positive analysis in Part IV. 
 216. There is a spirited debate about whether regulatory policy should, as a normative 
matter, be concerned with vertical leveraging at all. Compare, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, 
Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171 
(2002) (refuting economic concerns about vertical leveraging in media markets), with Jo-
seph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: 
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 109-12 (2003) (outlining regulatory contexts where vertical leveraging concerns 
are valid). This Article is only marginally relevant to that more general debate. My more 
limited point is that when the FCC has affirmatively decided to act to address vertical le-
veraging notwithstanding these objections, it should have the authority to do so under the 
ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. If the FCC, by contrast, feels that vertical leveraging poses 
no concern, it can simply refrain from regulating. 
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on the latter point, the framework would provide the FCC with max-
imum authority in situations where it is institutionally most likely to 
be acting against the interests of entrenched providers. Finally, after 
outlining these various normative benefits, this Part illustrates how 
the approach would work in practice by applying it to various indi-
vidual regulatory proceedings. 
A.   Normative Benefits of the Competition-Promotion Framework 
1.   Coherence 
 The first benefit of adopting the competition-promotion framework 
is that it would bring coherence and concrete limitations to the ancil-
lary jurisdiction doctrine. These objectives, however, are not merely 
ends in themselves. Achieving them will also protect the viability of 
the ancillary jurisdiction authority in the future. 
 Both courts and scholars have grown increasingly critical of the 
doctrine in recent years.217 These criticisms stem directly from the 
doctrine’s perceived inadequacies—namely, its alleged incoherence 
and potentially limitless scope. This Article has attempted to correct 
these perceptions. However, if left uncorrected, the perceptions could 
threaten the viability of the doctrine itself. The D.C. Circuit, for in-
stance, has grown particularly skeptical of the doctrine and arguably 
wants to abandon it. As illustrated in earlier sections, the court re-
cently has engaged in doctrinal gymnastics to avoid recognizing the 
FCC’s ancillary authority while nominally acknowledging Southwes-
tern Cable.
 While these criticisms raise important concerns, it is nonetheless 
important that the FCC retain some form of ancillary jurisdiction au-
thority. As courts have noted for years, the communications field is 
an inherently dynamic one that is characterized by rapidly changing 
technologies. The FCC therefore needs the flexibility to accommodate 
these changes to ensure that they do not undermine the agency’s 
regulatory goals.  
 Further, the structure of the communications industry makes it 
particularly fertile ground for potential anticompetitive conduct. 
Many vital services, particularly broadband and the vast array of 
services that rely on it, continue to depend upon access to underlying 
physical facilities owned by legacy monopoly providers. These pro-
viders are subject to little or no access competition.218 It is therefore 
critical that the FCC retain the authority to address these concerns. 
                                                                                                                    
 217. See supra Part II.C. 
 218. For instance, the broadband access market is frequently alleged to be—at best—a 
duopoly of cable and DSL (wireline telephone) providers. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford,
Network Rules, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 61-65 (2007).  
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 It does not follow, however, that the FCC should have unlimited 
authority. A better approach would be simply to define the doctrine’s 
scope more narrowly, which adopting the proposed competition 
framework would do. In particular, adopting this framework would 
address critics’ specific concerns without throwing the baby out with 
the bathwater. 
2.   Institutional Expertise/Preventing Agency Capture 
 Another significant benefit of adopting the competition-promotion 
framework is that facilitating this type of market competition within 
these industries falls more squarely within the FCC’s expertise and 
core competence. The FCC, unique among policymakers, has a global 
understanding of not only the various telecommunications indus-
tries, but the new dynamic interrelationships that convergence has 
created (e.g., cable companies providing “phone” service and vice ver-
sa). The FCC is therefore institutionally well suited to understand 
how technological or regulatory changes in one industry will affect 
other interrelated industries. In particular, the agency can assess po-
tential externalities imposed by the regulation or deregulation of a 
particular communications industry (e.g., does deregulation of broad-
band access limit video competition from new online providers?).  
 In addition, the FCC has extensive experience addressing con-
cerns about access to network facilities. Indeed, the problem of in-
cumbent providers leveraging their facilities has preoccupied the 
agency from its inception up through more modern problems, such as 
the implementation of the 1996 Act. 
 When the FCC, however, has strayed from these objectives, it has 
acted in areas where it has less institutional expertise. For instance, 
in the recent broadcast flag case, the FCC’s primary objective was to 
prevent copyright infringement. However, a separate federal agency, 
the United State Copyright Office, has far more expertise in this area 
than the FCC.219
 Another problem with promoting noneconomic regulatory objec-
tives is that these goals are inherently more contentious. The regula-
tory goal of promoting competition, by contrast, is less controversial. 
While parties sharply disagree about how to best promote competi-
tion and whether it is a realistic option in certain contexts, there ex-
ists a fairly wide consensus that facilitating market competition is a 
normatively appealing regulatory objective, other things being 
                                                                                                                    
 219. See BENJAMIN, LICHTMAN, SHELANSKI & WEISER, supra note 132, at 653. 
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equal.220 More socially oriented objectives such as programming di-
versity and localism, by contrast, are generally more controversial. 
 Note, however, that I am not casting doubt on the FCC’s ability to 
pursue regulatory social goals as a general matter. My more limited 
argument is that it should not do so under its ancillary authority, 
which could lead to perception of illegitimacy of the FCC’s ancillary 
regulations. Expanding the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction to enact con-
troversial social goals has arguably triggered a strong backlash that 
could ultimately weaken the entire doctrine. Instead, it would be 
wiser for the FCC to wait for a more explicit statutory delegation 
from Congress, the more politically accountable branch of government.  
 An additional concern with promoting social objectives is that 
they have, historically, proven more susceptible to agency capture 
and special interest regulation. Indeed, this is arguably what hap-
pened to the FCC in the 1970s as it passed increasingly anticompeti-
tive cable regulations. Under the guise of promoting vague concepts 
such as “programming diversity,” the FCC effectively hindered the 
growth of cable services for years. In a similar vein, the broadcast 
flag regulation was seemingly intended to benefit politically well-
connected incumbent industries. 
 Agency capture, of course, is not necessarily confined to social 
goals. Conceivably, the FCC could help incumbent providers just as 
easily under the guise of promoting “competitive neutrality.” Histori-
cally, however, this fear has been largely unfounded. Most of the cas-
es upholding ancillary jurisdiction have either helped new competi-
tors or limited the ability of incumbent providers to leverage their 
legacy facilities. The most likely reason is that the regulatory context 
of addressing vertical leveraging is, institutionally speaking, more 
likely to involve regulations adverse to the larger, more established 
provider who would benefit from the ability to leverage. 
 Essentially, I am proposing an interpretive rule of construction 
that construes the FCC’s powers under § 154(i) more broadly when 
the agency acts to promote competition in the face of vertical leverag-
ing concerns. One benefit of this interpretative canon is that it would 
reduce the potential for agency capture by erring on the side of new 
competitors. Established providers are often much more politically 
well connected than new rivals. And as noted above, they (particular-
ly legacy facilities owners) are much more likely to benefit from ver-
tical leveraging. For that reason, they have the incentive and the 
ability to resist proentry policies. Constraining the FCC’s ancillary 
                                                                                                                    
 220. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation 
of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325-26 (1998) (illustrating a broad 
shift in regulatory law over the last quarter of the twentieth century toward promoting 
market competition). 
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authority in this manner would maximize the agency’s authority 
within regulatory contexts where it is least likely to be helping estab-
lished incumbents. This type of doctrine would help prevent a repeat 
of the more egregious cable regulations in the 1970s that were trans-
parent attempts to stifle cable competition on behalf of broadcasters.  
3.   Legitimacy 
 Another benefit of the competition-promotion framework is its 
consistency with precedent. Assuming that courts’ decisions are es-
sentially policy preferences, the decades of precedent would help both 
legitimize the doctrine and avoid charges that courts are acting like 
self-appointed regulators. Instead, in the tradition of common law ju-
risprudence, they would be adopting a rule with a long and solid 
foundation in precedent. The consistency of the competition-
promotion framework with the case law would therefore increase the 
concept’s legitimacy and strengthen its doctrinal foundations. 
4.   Political Compromise 
 Finally, for those who think political preferences matter more 
than doctrinal logic, the competition-promotion framework 
represents an appealing political compromise.221 On the one hand, 
the framework appeals to skeptics of agency regulation by narrowing 
the agency’s regulatory powers and ensuring that it operates more 
clearly within its statutory delegation. On the other hand, it appeals 
to regulation advocates by ensuring that the agency can act to pre-
vent anticompetitive conduct by entrenched incumbents (particularly 
facilities owners) in emerging markets. 
B.   Regulatory Examples 
 This Section illustrates how the competition framework would 
look in practice by applying it to several modern regulatory proceed-
ings. In some of the proceedings, the framework suggests that courts 
should uphold ancillary regulations. In others, it suggests the opposite. 
1.   Comcast Throttling Proceeding 
 The FCC’s recent reprimand of Comcast is a textbook example of a 
proceeding where courts should uphold the FCC’s authority under 
the competition-promotion framework.222 As noted earlier, Comcast 
was discovered to be interfering with applications such as BitTorrent 
                                                                                                                    
 221. Interestingly, the hostility to ancillary jurisdiction does not necessarily track 
clean ideological lines. For instance, both Comcast and Susan Crawford, who have rather 
divergent views on broadband access policy, are both skeptical of broad ancillary jurisdiction. 
 222. See FCC Press Release, supra note 81.  
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that use peer-to-peer protocols.223 Critically, the FCC found that 
Comcast had an “anticompetitive motive” to interfere with these ap-
plications, which represent an emerging competitive threat to tradi-
tional cable video services: “Such applications, including those rely-
ing on BitTorrent, provide Internet users with the opportunity to 
view high-quality video that they might otherwise watch (and pay 
for) on cable television. Such video distribution poses a potential 
competitive threat to Comcast’s video-on-demand . . . service.”224
 Looking ahead, the D.C. Circuit should uphold the FCC’s order  
as a valid exercise of its ancillary authority to promote competition 
and prevent vertical leveraging. Notably, Comcast owns the underly-
ing facilities over which higher-layer applications such as BitTorrent 
run. Thus, the FCC’s order directly addresses the concern that Com-
cast will leverage control of its facilities to affect vertical markets 
(which is precisely what it did). More broadly, affirming the FCC’s 
broad authority to promote these types of objectives will create  
incentives for broadband access providers to refrain from future 
technologically novel techniques that achieve the same anticompeti-
tive purposes. In this respect, adopting the competition-promotion 
framework will provide economically beneficial signals to broadband 
access providers. 
 It is not strictly necessary that the FCC establish or even suspect 
an anticompetitive intent in the traditional antitrust sense. Instead, 
courts should uphold the regulations even assuming that Comcast 
acted solely for the more innocent purpose of managing congestion. 
Regardless of Comcast’s subjective motivation, its actions would  
nonetheless potentially impede video competition and other higher-
layer markets.225
2.   Open Network Regulations 
 The open network regulations recently proposed by the FCC 
would also be easily justified under the competition-promotion 
framework. While the proposed regulations encompass multiple poli-
cy debates,226 the animating fear among regulatory advocates 
throughout all of these contexts is that facilities-based broadband 
                                                                                                                    
 223. See supra note 79. 
 224. FCC Press Release, supra note 81. 
 225. My point is not to prevent broadband access providers from taking steps to avoid 
congestion (assuming they are consistent with open access and nondiscriminatory prin-
ciples). The larger point is that courts should not block, on jurisdictional grounds, the 
FCC’s attempts to act in this context, assuming the underlying regulations are designed to 
promote competition. The FCC should of course balance these various considerations in 
crafting an ultimate policy.
 226. The regulations, for instance, would impose network neutrality, open device at-
tachment, and other nondiscrimination and disclosure requirements. I refer to these policy 
debates collectively as “open network” policies. 
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providers will stifle competition in vertical markets that depend on 
incumbent facilities.227 For instance, the primary fear of network 
neutrality advocates is that infrastructure owners will leverage their 
control of these underlying facilities in economically harmful ways. 
These potential harms include establishing a prioritized “fast lane” 
for those services that can afford to pay a premium to the broadband 
access providers—premiums that would stifle new competitors by 
raising entry costs. A related fear is these providers could give their 
own affiliated services priority over competitive online services. 
 These same considerations would apply to the imposition of open 
network requirements as merger conditions. For instance, in the re-
cent AT&T and BellSouth mega-merger, the FCC negotiated “volun-
tary” conditions that included temporary network neutrality re-
quirements.228 Critics of these conditions argued that the FCC lacked 
the authority to impose such requirements (thus the need for “volun-
tary” conditions). 
 Even assuming, however, the FCC had explicitly imposed network 
neutrality requirements (either here or in similar proceedings), those 
requirements should have been upheld under the competition-
promotion framework. Here again, the FCC would have been ad-
dressing potential anticompetitive behavior made possible by the 
carriers’ control of legacy infrastructure.  
 Indeed, the specific language of the requirement illustrates these 
concerns. Under the merger condition, the new AT&T/BellSouth 
cannot “privilege[], degrade[] or prioritize[] any packet transmitted 
over AT&T/BellSouth’s wireline broadband Internet access service 
based on its source, ownership or destination.”229 The most notable 
aspect of this language is not what it prevents, but what it continues 
to allow. It would have been easier if the FCC simply prevented 
treating any packet differently for any reason. Instead, the FCC pro-
hibited specific types of differential treatment associated with limit-
ing competition in vertical markets. So long as they are crafted in 
this spirit, ancillary regulations imposing neutrality requirements 
should be upheld. 
 In short, open network requirements—whether one agrees or dis-
agrees with them—are primarily intended to promote and protect 
competition in adjacent markets. Accordingly, they are the types of 
ancillary regulations that fall squarely within the FCC’s institutional 
expertise and that warrant broader deference by courts under the 
competition-promotion framework. 
                                                                                                                    
 227. See generally Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM.
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3.   Public Safety 
 Courts, however, should reject the FCC’s ancillary regulations 
when the objective is to promote public safety. Few can deny that 
promoting public safety is a vitally important role of government. 
The problem, however, is less the merits of the objective itself  
and more that the FCC’s methods of promoting it have proven histor-
ically problematic. 
 Public safety as a regulatory objective has proven to be susceptible 
to agency capture and interest group regulation. Professor Susan 
Crawford has written at length of the FCC’s problematic drafting of 
recent public safety rules applied to VoIP voice service—specifically, 
E911 and Communications Assistance Law Enforcement Act 
(CALEA) requirements.230 While the new rules nominally involved 
promoting public safety, Crawford illustrates how in reality they 
were influenced—if not written entirely—by third-party private com-
panies that would benefit financially from them.  
 The goal in limiting ancillary jurisdiction in this context, then, is 
not to impede public safety regulations, but to force an institutional 
shift in the way the rules are drafted. Specifically, many of these 
concerns would be reduced if these responsibilities were shifted to 
Congress in the first instance. Airing these various issues out in 
Congress would ensure more public scrutiny and would at least re-
duce the chances that private parties could exploit public safety con-
cerns for financial gain. Professor Susan Crawford writes as follows: 
Out of the glare of public scrutiny that would likely accompany 
any attempt to legislate in the CALEA and E911 context, incum-
bents, law enforcement, and vendors of compliance services are 
finding it relatively easy to exact Commission rules that favor 
these parties and keep the world of telephony policy in place. 
These parties would find it relatively difficult to obtain these same 
rules from Congress, because more interest groups would be in-
volved and more eyes would be watching.231
 Interestingly, adopting the competition-promotion framework 
would address these precise concerns. While the agency proceedings 
would still be relatively obscure to the public, the framework I pro-
                                                                                                                    
 230. See Crawford, supra note 89, at 893-925. The FCC enacted these rules on both 
statutory grounds and on its Title I ancillary authority. Courts upheld both sets of regula-
tions by relying on direct statutory authority and not ancillary authority. Vonage Holdings 
Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Finding that the Commission has sec-
tion 254(d) authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to make USF contributions, 
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I ancillary jurisdiction.”); Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 232-35 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (relying on CALEA statute to affirm FCC authority). 
 231. Crawford, supra note 89, at 925.  
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pose would operate as an ex ante constraint that prevents the FCC 
from doing the bidding of the politically well-connected.  
VI.   CONCLUSION
 In this Article, I have attempted to correct popular misunders-
tandings of ancillary jurisdiction as a vague and potentially unli-
mited doctrine. It is particularly important to address these criti-
cisms given that they threaten to weaken the doctrine entirely. The 
competition-promotion framework accomplishes these goals and thus 
helps protect a doctrine that has proven vital in some of the country’s 
most important communications regulatory proceedings. The  
framework illustrates the coherence and limitations of the doctrine 
as courts have interpreted it. Further, it also provides a sound, 
workable, and politically acceptable roadmap for policymakers in  
the future as they grapple with the problems and potential of the  
intersection between new unforeseen technologies and traditional 
legacy infrastructure.  
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